Meeting the North Korean Nuclear Challenge


Attached please find what I believe will be a seminal analytical piece regarding the challenge posed by North Korea and its rapidly advancing nuclear weapons programs. The analysis and policy recommendations were prepared by three veteran officials who have served in senior positions in the U.S. intelligence, diplomatic and military fields, Keith Hansen, Rae Huffstutler, and Ted Morse.

Hansen, Huffstutler and Morse analyze North Korea’s goals, intentions, and capabilities, with a particular focus on Pyongyang’s growing nuclear arsenal. The three then make critical recommendations regarding what steps the US and its allies should take. They emphasize fielding viable ballistic missile defense systems, covert action, sanctions and, yes, negotiations. They warn that a US failure to blunt North Korea’s belligerency is likely to result in Japan, and possibly South Korea, developing their own nuclear arsenals.

The authors express doubt that a preemptive surgical strike on North Korea’s nuclear and conventional forces would be successful, and likely would cause unacceptable casualties and damage to our allies, South Korea and Japan, as well as to China, in addition to massive refugee flows.

This thought-provoking analytical and policy recommendation paper is attached. I highly recommend reading it carefully and look forward to your reactions.


Attach: Meeting the North Korea Nuclear Challenge

Meeting the North Korean Nuclear Challenge

Summary of the Presentation to the NSF on

Confronting North Korea


Ambassador Chris Hill

Former U.S. Ambassador to South Korea and Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Chris Hill gave a riveting presentation on the crisis with respect to North Korea and it’s rapidly advancing nuclear programs. Hill noted that this is the first time in over 50 years that any country has developed a nuclear weapons program whose missiles are aimed directly at the United States and its possessions. He observed that over time the U.S. has imposed penalties on Pyongyang and offered various incentives for a halt to its nuclear and missile developments, none of which has succeeded in stopping the advances.

There are numerous theories regarding why the North Koreans feel it so imperative to develop a nuclear weapons delivery capability. Obviously, the Kim Jung-Un regime feels that being a member of the nuclear club, with the capability of striking targets in the United States, assists in deterring potential adversaries from considering conducting military strikes against the North.

Hill noted that the North Korean nuclear program is not new—indeed, it has progressed for decades. The regime appears to be impervious to global criticism of its behavior. It also seems to believe that having a nuclear delivery capability brings it not only a deterrence capability, but “respect”—it cannot be treated as a “rogue regime”, but with respect….and fear! North Korea is an impoverished country that cannot feed its own people, but is willing to allocate extraordinary funds to it nuclear delivery programs, as well as its conventional military forces.

A longer-range goal is to eventually unify the Koreas under Pyongyang’s rule, an ambitious objective and one that requires convincing the U.S. that it would be better off leaving the peninsula and allowing the two Koreas to pursue their relationship independently. There is little support for this concept in South Korea, which recently has taken a much softer line toward the North than the U.S. And, there seems to be a growing sense of isolationism in the USA with the election of President Trump and a desire to get out of many “entangling alliances”.

The Republic of North Korea (RNK) has positioned a significant component of its military forces along the DMZ. They have developed a vast system of defenses and tunnels, making it difficult for the U.S. or South Korea to decisively defeat the North should it launch a preemptive attack with conventional forces. Utilizing the U.S. nuclear capability would inflict severe damage on the North, but the radiation impact on South Korea, China, Japan and Russia could be significant.

Hill, who also served as the head of the U.S. delegation to the Six Party talks on the North Korean nuclear issues, warned that there are no easy options to persuade North Korea to halt or slow its nuclear programs. He stressed that despite the difficulties encountered in negotiating with the RNK, the U.S. and its allies must persist in attempting various strategies to eventually persuade Pyongyang from pursuing the nuclear programs. This is necessary so that China, and especially South Korea, feel that Washington is sincere in its attempts to resolve the crisis peacefully and is not going to quickly unleash “Fire and Fury” on the North, as President Trump has threatened.

The Ambassador argued in favor of continuing talks aimed at lessening tensions, but also to increase sanctions on the North. He also strongly endorsed accelerating defenses against a North Korean attack, with the deployment of the THAAD anti-ballistic missile capability a high priority.

Hill thought the current U.S. administration is pursuing too many objectives at once (“If everything is a priority, nothing is a priority”). The key, he believes, lies in persuading China to step up and accept greater responsibility for reigning in the rogue regime in Pyongyang. Yes, Beijing has not been helpful to date, but the key to any resolution of this crisis lies in China putting pressure on its “ally” to ameliorate its aggressive military programs. China, the North’s major trading partner and benefactor, is the only country with the means to do this.

In the question period, Hill was wary of believing that a preemptive strike on the North by the U.S. could achieve the objective of severely damaging North Korea’s missile and conventional forces. He noted that many of the key facilities are buried underground and in hardened bunkers. Further, the bulk of its conventional forces are deployed right along the border with South Korea. And, conducting a surprise attack would be difficult in that the U.S. must first notify Seoul of it plans so that South Korea could get its population into shelters.

Hill was asked if other means might be effective in moderating the North’s behavior or, in case of war, limiting its capabilities. Yes, and that would include not just anti-missile programs, but a comprehensive and widespread cyber intrusion program.

The Ambassador discussed several sensitive issues, including the baffling and constant “reorganization” at the State Department, and the lack of skilled professionals in key (political appointees) offices. He recognized that Japan would now be more seriously considering deploying its own nuclear capability despite the constitutional prohibition against that, but felt that would not happen soon. With respect to Russia, he felt that the Putin regime should be consulted, but doubted that Moscow could exercise much influence in this region.

This was one of our best attended programs (over 320!) and it was clear that all participants would welcome Ambassador Chris Hill back soon to address the National Security Forum!

– Tyrus W. Cobb and Patty Evans

Save the date for this very timely and critical topic

President Trump Inherits America’s Longest War

Why His Policy Direction is the
Best Option Now for the U.S. to Pursue

With (LTC-USA/Ret) Bill Conrad

The Sands, Friday October 6, 9:00 a.m. 

Following the 9/11 attacks in 2001, the United States demanded that the Taliban turn over Osama bin Laden, who we believed to be the mastermind behind the seizure of four civilian airliners and turn them into suicide weapons, three of which successfully struck targets, including the World Trade Center. The Taliban refused, and on October 7 the U.S. launched “Operation Enduring Freedom”, and was soon joined by the UK and other allies, including in Afghanistan, the Northern Alliance. The UN later established the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). In 2003 NATO assumed the leadership of the ISAF force, with over 40 countries participating.

After a few early setbacks, the Taliban responded and grew stronger, making significant territorial gains. Violence escalated in the 2007-09 period, the fighting expanded into Pakistan, and coalition troop numbers escalated through 2011, eventually reaching 140,000. Of these the U.S. deployed just over 100,000. However, after years of stalemate, the U.S. announced in 2014 that “major combat operations” would cease and since then responsibility for the conduct of the war has shifted to the Afghan government in Kabul. There are now less than 13,000 foreign troops in Afghanistan.

President Trump recently announced a troop strength increase of 4,000 in support of “Operation Resolute Support”, the NATO-led successor to ISAF. Bill Conrad will argue that the President’s new policy can defeat the Taliban and win the war!  He believes that the effort can best succeed by further delegating “decision authority” down to battlefield commanders. He also would demand that the U.S. put pressure on Pakistan’s ISI (Inter-Service Intelligence) to eliminate Taliban sanctuaries in Pakistan.

Conrad served in Afghanistan several times, including two tours as an Army Lt. Colonel Civil Affairs officer, and another two tours as a DOD civil servant (GS-15) with both the French Army and with coalition forces at the ISAF Joint command headquarters in Kabul.

No need to RSVP now. Please just save this date!

Regarding The Prospect of North Korea Causing

Disruption with A Biological Weapon


James M Wilson V, MD FAAP
Director, Nevada Medical Intelligence Center
School of Community Health Science
University of Nevada-Reno

The prospect of armed conflict with North Korea weighs heavily on all of our minds right now, particularly given that we appear to be dealing with a regime seemingly impervious to diplomacy and international sanctions. While the world is (and should be) primarily concerned with scenarios involving nuclear and conventional weapons engagements, it is worthwhile to pause and consider other scenarios whispered over beers among analysts.

In my world, we fret over the specter of biological weapons. We fret because history has shown us other recalcitrant, isolated regimes who have ignored instruments such as the 1925 Geneva Protocol and 1972 Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). A quick review of the official BWC website does not reassure us that North Korea is a committed signatory (see the number of meetings they have attended in recent years, for example). Most analysts in health security and biodefense consider North Korea to have an offensive biological weapons program. Indeed, history has shown us political instruments like the Geneva Protocol and BWC have proven un-enforceable. Examples include the Germans and Japanese in World War II, the former Soviet Union’s biological warfare program, and recently re-examined allegations of mass-scale biological weapon deployments in Rhodesia in the late 1970s .

Biological weapons can be deployed in a surreptitious manner. While classic military strategists focus on aerosol deployment on the battlefield (or, in the case of the Koreas, across the DMZ) to target military forces, the smart bioweaponeer might take a page from the Japanese Imperial Army’s Unit 731 . Unit 731 viewed biological weapons as a means to disrupt, confuse, or stress the enemy’s civil infrastructure prior to attack with conventional weapons. Under this kind of scenario, any unusual infectious disease activity in South Korea should prompt rapid verification and response.

However, the world continues to have several major problems in a bio-warfare environment. One is determining attribution. While it is generally believed that any confirmed offensive biological weapon deployment would be answered with a nuclear response, this is in reality a difficult policy to execute. The reality is the world of public health has shown us a disturbing inability to proper assess risk, communicate that risk in a well-considered, balanced manner to stakeholders, conduct effective surveillance and response operations, and clearly demonstrate claimed “lessons learned” have indeed been… learned. Recent uncomfortable examples include the 2009 H1N1 influenza pandemic, Ebola disaster, Zika crisis, and the currently unfolding antimicrobial resistance disaster. Credibility in the public health enterprise has been badly eroded, and the world currently lacks an effective health security intelligence system coupled to an effective response mechanism. Biodefense and the instruments of monitoring compliance of the BWC are utterly reliant on public health infrastructure. That infrastructure has shown us, for decades now, that it is overwhelmed, slow to act, and highly resistant to calls for change. In the context of a scenario of North Korean “biological mischief” conducted in South Korea, this is a grave liability.

From the civil medical infrastructure perspective, we have observed South Korea’s public health behave in ways suggestive of lessons not learned in the wake of SARS. During the emergence of SARS, the US military raised serious concerns about whether effective surveillance and response could be conducted in the South Korean civil medical and public health infrastructure… and how that might affect combat effectiveness. This concern was validated during the introduction of MERS to South Korea. During that period, officials were slow to recognize the initial appearance of MERS in South Korea and information was suppressed to avoid anxiety, which impaired effective response. This is a common, unfortunate behavior among Ministries of Health throughout the world when confronted with unusual, non-routine outbreaks.

One may reasonably surmise that the South Korean government will behave in a similar manner in the hypothetical context of an outbreak of unusual, non-routine infectious disease, especially if that disease is associated with unusually high morbidity or mortality. And, particularly if questions of possible biological weapon deployments are raised. As seen with both SARS and MERS, it is impossible for any government to keep these types of crises hidden for long. The public eventually discovers rumors of the situation and takes matters into their own hands, often in response to their government’s lack of transparency. While rare, civil unrest and incendiary violence are potential outcomes in this kind of situation. It is important to note that state failure, however, has not been documented in known history due solely to an outbreak of disease.

So the uncomfortable scenario of a surreptitious deployment of rapidly transmissible disease in a high population dense environment like Seoul indeed could cause a high degree of disruption and distraction in an already politically charged environment. It would be naïve to think that South Korea’s public health and medical infrastructure would behave any differently than we have seen thus far: there will be information suppression and disorganized response with potential for civil unrest. As we saw with the Amerithrax investigation and the aforementioned Rhodesia anthrax epidemic, there is real potential for tremendous delays in proving attribution if North Korea actually did intentionally release a disease in South Korea. This of course assumes attribution could be proven at all. The reality is, there may be little the international community could do to stop such an event from happening, and there may be little the international community could do to prove attribution.

In summary, the world should continue to prioritize the obvious threat of nuclear engagement with North Korea, but also be mindful of alternative scenarios where North Korea could still cause tremendous mischief in the region, including initiating a biological attack!


Registration will close at 9 am on September 11th

Confronting North Korea


Ambassador Christopher Hill


With a record number of attendees already registered we will be closing registration at 9 am on Monday September 11th.

The Sands Regency, Tuesday September 12, 2017, 9:00 a.m.

North Korea’s test of an intercontinental ballistic missile was a major step forward in its growing capability to deliver ICBMs with nuclear warheads as far as the Western United States. The U.S. and its allies have pursued a number of steps to eliminate or at least restrict Pyongyang’s capability to deliver weapons armed with nuclear warheads over great distances, but nothing has worked. America and allies in the region have tried to fashion a diplomatic, negotiated agreement, but North Korea seems uninterested. The U.S. has also pursued sanctions against Pyongyang, and while they have had some domestic impact, they have been insufficient to change the course the North Korean dictator, Kim Jong-Un, is pursuing. Nor surprising, the Pentagon is drawing up plans for the implementation of various military options, alternatives that now seem more possible given North Korean intransigence and President Trump’s threat to bring “Fire and Fury” on that country.

President Trump has also tried to persuade China, the one country that would seem to have leverage over North Korea, to join in the sanctions regime and to put additional diplomatic and economic pressure on Pyongyang. Beijing seems uninterested in assisting in restricting North Korean aggression and in opening up the country to foreign influences. In fact, new data shows that China’s trade with its North Korean neighbor has increased substantially this year, including sending much needed food, fuel and machinery to sustain the North Korean economy. China clearly is unwilling to do Washington’s bidding and put pressure on Pyongyang.

This makes the “military option” that much more likely. Such a preemptive operation would likely include a “surgical strike” on North Korean missile sites to remove its capability of launching ICBMs. The attack would likely include strikes against the country’s political leadership, including Kim Jong Un. In addition, the US/allied preemption would likely include a massive cyber attack designed to destroy the North’s communications systems and military command and control. However, such a strike would probably lead to Pyongyang hitting back hard with thousands of artillery rounds landing in South Korea and, possibly, Japan. That would likely kill hundreds of thousands, including U.S. troops stationed in both countries.  In sum, there are no good options for dealing with an intransigent North Korean regime, but a decision regarding a preemptive strike is likely to be forthcoming soon.

Ambassador Chris Hill is uniquely qualified to speak to this challenge. Hill is the former U.S. Ambassador to South Korea and Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, during which time he served as the head of the U.S. delegation to the Six Party Talks on the North Korea nuclear issue. He has also served as the American Ambassador to Iraq, Poland, and Macedonia, and as Senior Director on the staff of the National Security Council. He currently is the Dean of the Korbel School of International Studies at the University of Denver.

Click here to RSVP

 Please join us for what will be a very interesting discussion. A full breakfast will be served ($15 Members, $25 Non-Members, and $10 for students with ID and military personnel in uniform; free for WWII Veterans). We recommend that you arrive by 8:30 to enjoy some breakfast, coffee and conversation.