Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta confided to reporters while on the way to a NATO conference that the U.S. would end its combat role in Afghanistan a year earlier than expected, and will soon begin to shift responsibility increasingly to CIA and DOD Special Operations Forces rather than large, conventional ground forces. The announcement surprised—and alarmed—the Afghan government and key American allies. The White House has spent a lot of energy trying to walk this comment back, and have expressed irritation that this major revision of policy should have emanated from the White House.

The plan would represent a major shift in operational strategy, resulting in the removal of the 32,000 “surge” forces sent in to reinforce our struggling counter-insurgency/nation-building (COIN) effort. The new focus will rely more on SOF/paramilitary units to counter residual terrorist threats, elite commando teams that will target insurgent commanders and terrorist leaders. U.S. forces will continue to train Afghan military and police units, on whom more of the day by day burden of fighting the war will fall.

The Washington Post reports that Panetta’s remarks also “poured fuel” on an ongoing debate within the administration over the right mix of negotiating with the Taliban and killing them. Some officials feel that the revelation weakens the NATO/US hand before more talks with Taliban representatives in Qatar later this month.

The United States now has about 90,000 troops in Afghanistan, with about 22,000 slated to come home by fall. Previously the administration had said that 2014 would see the end of U.S. combat operations, and now that timetable appears to have been moved up at least a year.

The revised strategy would appear to represent a reversal of President Obama’s description of the Afghan conflict as the war that needed to be fought (as opposed to Iraq) and the surge of troop strength he committed just last year to the war. Political and military realities have now superseded any previous assessments, as the American public wearies of the war in an election year and the Afghan partnership is fraying. Civilian and military leaders alike are disappointed by the continued incompetence and corruption of the Karzai government, the abysmal performance by police units, and the tenacity of the Taliban and other insurgent groups.

While the war has always been unpopular with Obama’s base, the conflict is enduring a lessening of support from Republicans and Independents as well. All are tiring of the seemingly endless conflict and the difficulties in changing the Afghan culture. More are gravitating to the approach advocated earlier by Vice-President Joe Biden which would rely more on Special Operations forces, raids, drone attacks, and “targeted assassinations” of key Taliban leaders.

The Panetta “announcement” also comes alongside the unauthorized leak of a NATO study that predicts a Taliban takeover of Afghanistan following the departure of ISAF forces (US/Europe). The estimate provides further fuel to stoke the disgruntlement of the American populace with the costs of the war, both in terms of lives and money, and the seemingly improbable quest for a successful outcome. Panetta’s statement will be greeted with shock, initially, on the part of our Allies, but most will be only too glad to see an earlier departure timetable.

Most likely the new approach will be resisted by the military commanders on the ground, who feel they are making progress and need more time, more money, and more troops. That’s not likely to happen, making General John Allen’s task as the ISAF commanding general much more challenging than it is even today.

////////////

Speaking of Secretary Panetta’s bluntness, two other recent comments by the SecDef have also generated surprise and some shock. First it was the revelation that a Pakistani doctor (name provided!) was instrumental in assisting the U.S. in ascertaining Osama bin Laden’s residence and his location. This was done before the doctor could be spirited out of the country and it is far from clear why Panetta revealed this doctor’s role.

Panetta also hinted strongly that there is a strong likelihood that Israel would strike Iran as early as April, a highly unusual muse by a Defense Secretary. I’m personally not sure if this isn’t just part of a coherent “public diplomacy” (disinformation) campaign being conducted by the West to convince the Iranian leadership that an Israeli attack is imminent and they’d better become more accommodating with respect to their nuclear program. Whichever, we are witnessing a flurry of “insider leaks” from Israel and the U.S. that seem to indicate that the possibility of an Israeli strike on Iran is becoming more likely. Certainly the comments from Tel Aviv are also pointed in that direction.

Meanwhile, In Tehran, the supreme leader, Ali Khamenei, in a defiant address, said that nothing would impede his regime from its objective of acquiring nuclear weapons. “Sanctions will not have any impact on our determination to pursue our nuclear course”, he proclaimed. Khamenei seemed buoyed by the possibility of an Israeli strike, in fact, and almost welcomes it.

What worries me is that he just might. With the Iranian economy in a tailspin, the populace increasingly disgruntled with the religious and civilian leadership, and social media stirring up the youth, the mullahs and the military may feel that the only thing that could salvage their position and unite the Iranian people would be an attack by Israel and, by implication, the U.S.

And, here in the U.S., as the 2012 presidential election moves closer, the question of which candidate is closer to Israel will be a key campaign debating point. That means that the impetus for the administration and the GOP candidate to appear fully supportive of Israel at this crucial juncture will drive positions further toward backing whatever Tel Aviv decides to do. I suspect the Israeli leadership knows that full well, and that factor may also enter into their own calculations on the timetable and advisability of a strike this year.

Keep watching—this will only get more interesting!

• Tyrus W. Cobb,

Former Special Assistant to President Reagan

February 5, 2012

BUT RAISES HOST OF LEGAL AND MORAL ISSUES—FOR SOME

The killing of leading Al Qaeda propagandist and operational leader Anwar al-Awlaki concludes a relentless search and kill operation conducted by a joint CIA-JSOC (Joint Special Operations Command) group that began over two years ago. The strike reinforces President Obama’s image as a relentless hunter of AQ terrorists, and signifies another step in the shifting manner in which the United States is conducting the war on terrorism.

This drone strike on Awlaki was also the first known to be launched against an American (he had dual US-Yemeni citizenship) and as such has raised a number of legal, moral and constitutional issues.

The killing of Awlaki is another in a series of highly successful strikes against Al Qaeda leaders and field commanders over the past two years. Awlaki’s death follows the killing of the #2 AQ official, Atiyah Abd al-Rahman, in August and Osama bin Laden in May. While al-Awlaki was primarily known as a skilled propagandist with native fluency in English, the Obama administration has taken great pains to describe him as a key operational figure as well. Not hard to do—Awlaki prepared Abdul Mutallab’s attempt to blow up a Northwest Airlines plane in Christmas 2009, inspired Major Hassan to conduct his deadly killing of servicemen at Ft. Hood, and participated in plots designed in Yemen by Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) against targets in the U.S. and Yemen.

Awlaki was born in New Mexico to Yemini parents and first gained notoriety from his inflammatory preaching in San Diego. While there the FBI said he had contact with two of the 9/11 highjackers. He returned to Yemen in 2004 and his English-language screeds became even more stridently anti-American. Awlaki had been on the radar screen of both U.S. and American-trained Yemini Special Forces units for more than two years.

This latest in a series of CIA-JSOC successes has also raised two major concerns. First, critics of the administration’s counter-terrorism (CT) policy, mainly from the left, charge that the Obama administration is conducting a ruthless CT strategy that far exceeds anything that President Bush and his team devised. Secondly, given that a U.S. citizen was targeted, that the President has ignored constitutional constraints against killing Americans unless they have had the benefit of “due process of law”.

THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION’S EXPANDING CT CAMPAIGN

There is no doubt that the campaign to exterminate known terrorists has accelerated under President Obama. One critic complained that “It is apparent that Obama’s relentless covert campaign knows no boundaries”, a fairly accurate observation. Even Republican candidates for President have applauded the Obama team’s strategy and conduct of its CT operations.

As the NYT noted today, “Disillusioned by huge costs and uncertain outcomes in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Obama administration has decisively embraced the drone, along with small-scale lightning raids” such as the one that killed OBL. American officials are relying more and more on what is seen as a “cheap, safe, and precise” tool to eliminate enemies. As we all recall, just a few years ago “nation-building” and COIN (counter-insurgency) was “all the rage”. But shrinking budgets and diminished public enthusiasm for large deployments over long periods of time have made COIN much less attractive. There is precious little appetite for the “risk, cost and long timelines” required for a successful COIN strategy, the Times article concludes.

Indeed, the number of Predator drone strikes has more than tripled during Obama’s presidency. Early on the focus was on Pakistan, but now drones are being flown from new, highly secret bases in Somalia and Yemen, for example. The strike against Awlaki was the first in Yemen since 2002. Some observers have expressed concern over the potential for the CIA-JSOC teams to become involved in the increasingly deadly civil war in that country.

Another less remarked on aspect of the drone strikes is that they have enhanced Obama’s image as a relentless hunter of AQ and other terrorists. Indeed, the President’s popularity shot up right after the successful strike on OBL’s compound, as it did after the killing of Awlaki. However, those jumps have not been sustainable and the dreary economic forecast brings those numbers down in short order.

WAS THE STRIKE ON AWLAKI LEGAL? MORAL?

The nature of Awlaki’s death raised important legal and moral issues about the evidence against him and whether or not he was given the “due process” of law that all American citizens enjoy. Under the Administration’s reasoning, Awlaki and other terrorists can be targeted because they are deemed to pose an “imminent threat” or a have been identified as part of an “enemy army”. The President apparently issued a finding recently that placed Awlaki in both of those categories. The American Civil Liberties Union—and they are not alone—have condemned the killing as illegal and unconstitutional.

It seems to me that the Administration is on firm ground here. First, Awlaki did pose an imminent threat to lives of Americans given his involvement in the plot to blow up an airliner, and secondly, he had been fighting alongside the enemy in armed conflict with the U.S. While it is true that Awlaki received less due process than he would have been permitted from a court, the thorough and unusual steps the administration took to characterize and define Awlaki seem prudent and appropriate.

I do not agree with the ACLU and other critics that this killing amounts to “extrajudicial execution” nor that it violates international law. Having said that we must be alert that our oversight does not become too elastic, specifically in defining what constitutes an “imminent threat” and when, where and against whom we launch these “targeted assassinations”.

GOING FORWARD

In the future we can anticipate increased reliance on drone strikes and targeted killings of key terrorist leaders and their followers. It may be part of what some see as the ongoing “militarization” of the CIA and the intelligence community as the Agency often will command military forces in these secret operations and uniformed officers play a growing role in the intelligence apparatus. We can anticipate a greater reliance on drones and new kinds of air power, weapons that are very seductive given their lower costs, stealth employment, and to date, impressive results. This has become, some would argue, the emerging “American Way of War”.

Tyrus W. Cobb

NSF Minister of Enlightenment

October 2, 2011

I might note that the military has also looked at two alternatives. One would go from an Iranian port on the Gulf of Oman into Afghanistan, clearly the best and most direct route, but one obvioulsy impossible to consider today (but do remember that the Sunni-oriented Taliban were Iran’s primary enemy in the post 2000 time frame). Another route quietly being raised would go through China, traverse that country on its railroad system and go into Kazakhstan. That was raised in 2009 and the PRC was initially open to discussions, but Beijing has apparently flat out rejected any discussion of that alternative today as our relations have soured.

Read on about this most difficult challenge. Ty

‘A logistics miracle’

To lessen its dependence on Pakistan, the U.S. military has greatly expanded its use of supply lines through Russia and Central Asia to deliver equipment and material to the war zone in Afghanistan. Those routes, known collectively as the Northern Distribution Network, are much more circuitous and expensive than the supply lines through Pakistan but are also considered more stable.

Source: National Geospatial Intelligence Agency. By Gene Thorp – The Washington Post. Published on July 2, 2011, 11:12 p.m.

U.S. turns to other routes to supply Afghan war as relations with Pakistan fray

By Craig Whitlock

Washington Post, July 3, 2011

The U.S. military is rapidly expanding its aerial and Central Asian supply routes to the war in Afghanistan, fearing that Pakistan could cut off the main means of providing American and NATO forces with fuel, food and equipment.

Although Pakistan has not explicitly threatened to sever the supply lines, Pentagon officials said they are concerned the routes could be endangered by the deterioration of U.S.-Pakistan relations, partly fed by ill will from the cross-border raid that killed Osama bin Laden.

Memories are fresh of Pakistan’s temporary closure of a major crossing into Afghanistan in September, resulting in a logjam of hundreds of supply trucks and fuel tankers, dozens of which were destroyed in attacks by insurgents.

While reducing the shipment of cargo through Pakistan would address a strategic weakness that U.S. military officials have long considered an Achilles’ heel, shifting supply lines elsewhere would substantially increase the cost of the war and make the United States more dependent on authoritarian countries in Central Asia.

A senior U.S. defense official said the military wants to keep using Pakistan, which offers the most direct and the cheapest routes to Afghanistan. But the Pentagon also wants the ability to bypass the country if necessary.

With landlocked Afghanistan lacking seaports, and hostile Iran blocking access from the west, Pentagon logisticians have limited alternatives.

“It’s either Central Asia or Pakistan — those are the two choices. We’d like to have both,” the defense official said, speaking on the condition of anonymity to avoid alienating Pakistan. “We’d like to have a balance between them, and not be dependent on either one, but always have the possibility of switching.”

U.S. military officials said they have emergency backup plans in case the Pakistan routes became unavailable.

“We will be on time, all the time,” said Vice Adm. Mark D. Harnitchek, deputy commander of the U.S. Transportation Command, which oversees the movement of supplies and equipment.

In such an event, however, the military would have to deliver the bulk of its cargo by air, a method that might not be sustainable; it costs up to 10 times as much as shipping via Pakistan.

“We’d have to be a little bit more mindful of what we put in the pipe,” Harnitchek said.

The Defense Department is already boosting the amount of cargo it sends to Afghanistan by air. To save on costs, the military is shipping as many of those supplies as possible to seaports in the Persian Gulf before loading them on planes bound for the war zone.

As recently as 2009, the U.S. military moved 90 percent of its surface cargo through Pakistan, arriving by ship at the port in Karachi and then snaking through mountain passes, deserts and remote tribal areas before crossing the border into Afghanistan. The Pakistan supply lines are served entirely by contractors instead of U.S. military convoys and are vulnerable to bandits, insurgents and natural disasters.

Today, almost 40 percent of surface cargo arrives in Afghanistan from the north, along a patchwork of Central Asian rail and road routes that the Pentagon calls the Northern Distribution Network. Military planners said they are pushing to raise the northern network’s share to as much as 75 percent by the end of this year.

Obama administration officials said they are negotiating expanded agreements with Kazakhstan,Uzbekistan and other countries that would allow for the delivery of additional supplies to the Afghan war zone. Washington also wants permission to withdraw vehicles and other equipment from Afghanistan as the U.S. military prepares to pull out one-third of its forces by September 2012.

By shifting the burden to Central Asia, however, the U.S. military has become increasingly reliant on authoritarian countries, prompting criticism from human rights groups that the Obama administration is cozying up to dictators.

For instance, more than one-third of the northern-route cargo passes through tiny Azerbaijan, a country saddled by “pervasive corruption,” according to the State Department’s annual human rights report. U.S. defense officials also say the northern supply lines would not be possible without the cooperation of Russia. One new route runs through Siberia.

The biggest potential choke point, however, lies in Uzbekistan, a former Soviet republic that borders northern Afghanistan. It previously had kicked the U.S. military out of the country after Washington complained about the killing of hundreds of protesters in 2005.

But as the United States has deepened its involvement in Afghanistan, relations with Uzbekistan have warmed up again. Today, more than 80 percent of supplies shipped along the Northern Distribution Network pass through the country.

Expanded supply lines

The northern routes were developed in the waning days of the George W. Bush administration. Since then, the U.S. government has expanded the network into a spiderweb of supply lines.

Some start at Baltic seaports and run through Russia and Central Asia by rail. Another key line picks up traffic on the Black Sea and funnels it through the Caucasus region. One winding truck route begins at a U.S. Army depot at Germersheim, Germany, and ends, an average of 60 days later, at Bagram air base in Afghanistan. As with the Pakistan routes, the deliveries are all made by contractors.

“If you look at what we’ve done there in the last two years, we look at it more or less as a logistics miracle,” said Alan F. Estevez, the Pentagon’s principal deputy assistant secretary for logistics.

There are two big limitations, however, on what the Pentagon can ship through Central Asia. First, supplies are generally restricted to food, water and construction material; ammunition, weapons and other “lethal” cargo are prohibited.

Also, the routes are strictly one-way. Nothing can be shipped back out of the war zone.

U.S. officials said they are trying to negotiate deals with several countries to remove those restrictions. That will be crucial as the United States withdraws 33,000 troops from Afghanistan over the next 15 months, military leaders said.

Perhaps the most vital section in the northern network is a rail line that crosses south through Uzbekistan and over the Amu Darya river to reach Hairaton, Afghanistan. About five out of every six cargo containers travel this route.

“In reality, Uzbekistan is really at the center of all these routes,” said Alexander Cooley, a Barnard College professor and an expert on U.S. military relations in Central Asia. “They’re certainly in the catbird seat. And they know it.”

The final leg of the Uzbek rail line, from the city of Karshi to the Afghan border, underscores how the U.S. military has been forced to rely on rickety routes to sustain its troops.

In November 2009, U.S. embassy officials in Tashkent, the Uzbek capital, were warned by a confidential source that the tracks were brittle and at risk of fracturing if trains carried more than half their usual loads. On top of that, the Soviet-era locomotives carrying U.S. cargo were not designed to cross steep mountains; engineers had to apply the brakes almost constantly as they moved downhill.

“By the time the trains have descended from the mountains, the wheels are glowing red hot,” the embassy reported in a diplomatic cable. The source, an engineer, said he was “appalled by how long it takes to transport anything by rail in Uzbekistan” and that he refused to take the train for fear of a crash.

The cable, titled “Uzbek Rail: Red Hot Wheels to Afghanistan” and obtained by the anti-secrecy Web site WikiLeaks, concluded that “a train wreck is possible in the literal sense.”

U.S. military officials said they knew of no accidents or safety problems on the 200-mile rail segment. In February, Uzbekistan announced it had obtained a $218 million loan from Japan to upgrade the line to the Afghan border.

Human rights concerns

Uzbekistan has been assailed by human rights groups for repression under President Islam Karimov, who has ruled the country since the breakup of the Soviet Union. Freedom House, a Washington-based advocacy group, ranks it as one of the nine worst countries in the world for civil liberties and political rights.

From 2001 to 2005, the U.S. military relied on an Uzbek air base as a hub for combat and supply missions to Afghanistan. U.S. forces were evicted from the base after Washington pressured Karimov to allow an international probe into the deaths of hundreds of anti-government protesters in the province of Andijan.

Since 2008, however, Washington has steadily worked to repair relations. A stream of U.S. military leaders and diplomats has visited Tashkent, including Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton in December andDenis McDonough, the deputy national security adviser, in late May. Uzbekistan, in turn, has reopened its railroads, highways and airspace for U.S. cargo.

Thomas M. Sanderson, an analyst with the Center for Strategic and International Studies, said that the Obama administration has continued to raise human rights concerns with Uzbekistan but that the Afghan supply routes usually take precedence.

“There is no doubt about it. We are there for one primary reason, and that is to enable our operations in Afghanistan,” said Sanderson, who has studied the Northern Distribution Network.

State Department officials said they do not hesitate to press Uzbekistan to improve its human rights record.When Clinton visited Tashkent, they noted, she made a point of meeting activists and calling for the release of jailed journalists.

“We’ve made a real effort to try to engage Uzbekistan on human rights and in trafficking persons, and in some cases there’s been some progress,” said Robert O. Blake, assistant secretary of state for South and Central Asia. “This is something that’s in their own interest to do, to allow greater freedom of religion and greater freedom of expression.”

Diplomatic cables, however, show Uzbek officials have not hesitated to demand U.S. restraint on human rights in exchange for cooperation on the supply routes.

In March 2009, shortly after the State Department gave an award to an Uzbek human rights activist, Foreign Minister Vladi­mir Norov made an “implicit threat” to suspend deliveries to Afghanistan, according to a cable signed by Richard B. Norland, the U.S. ambassador in Tashkent at the time.

An angry Karimov also complained to Norland personally.

“Put yourself in my place,” Karimov told the ambassador, according to the cable. “Would you trust me if I had done this?”

In that cable and others to Washington, Norland counseled the Obama administration to check its public criticism of Karimov to maintain the viability of the supply lines. In advance of a visit to Tashkent by a senior State Department official, Norland advised using “private, but frank diplomacy” to cajole Uzbekistan rather than “more openly coercive measures.”

“Uzbek pride often gets the better of rationality and officials here will think nothing of cutting off their nose to spite their face,” Norland added in a July 2009 cable.

UNLIKELY TO PLEASE ANYONE

President Obama’s decision to withdraw 33,000 U.S. troops from Afghanistan by next summer is unlikely to be greeted enthusiastically by anyone. Those on the far left and right of the political spectrum—unlikely soul mates on this issue—will complain that the withdrawal is far too modest and does little to reduce our commitment to this war.

Those who believe that any withdrawal at this critical time would negate the successes our troops have won on the battlefield, and open the door to a restoration of Al Qaeda safe havens, will cry that the President is “snatching defeat from the jars of imminent victory”. They will argue that such a decision is best left in the hands of the Generals in the field and the Pentagon leadership, who have recommended zero or minimal force reductions.

What struck me most is how fast the President seems to have abandoned his position that not only was this the “Good War”, in contrast to the Iraq “quagmire”, but that this was a “War of Necessity”. This is not a “war of choice”, but a war that had to be won. He lamented—once again—that we squandered time, manpower and resources in Iraq, while the Taliban reasserted control over large parts of Afghanistan, a country far more critical to our national interests.

This is not to say that there are insufficient reasons to justify a withdrawal. The main target of our efforts, Osama bin Laden, is dead and lying at the bottom of the ocean. The leadership of Al Qaeda has been decimated, leaving it a spent force. The Taliban remains a formidable force in that it can strike at will, but it cannot control any territory or population. Finally, there has been a significant increase in the size—if not the capability—of the Afghan security forces.

Obama risks losing these gains, which are fragile at best, however. The central Afghan government is weak and corrupt, the Afghan security forces unproven on the battlefield, the Taliban can threaten virtually any target in the country, and, our biggest concern, neighboring Pakistan still provides sanctuaries for insurgent forces and Muslim radicals.

The impetus for the withdrawal lies here at home. Polls show that America is weary of this war, and more than 60% favor bringing our troops home immediately. The country wants more focus on “nation building” here, not in some remote Southwest Asian country. They want the $100 billion a year the war costs redirected domestically to help jump start the economic recovery. And they worry how many more caskets will be flown into Dover, how many more “wounded warriors” we will treat, how many cases of battlefield stress we must address.

I was struck by President Obama’s “business-like” approach in this speech. Nowhere were there any clarion calls to “pay any price” for freedom (JFK), no “blood, sweat and tears” (Churchill), no ringing declaration to defeat the global Communist movement (Reagan). How does “We will steadfastly train Afghan forces” inspire our troops?

But let’s keep things in perspective. Even after we reduce our presence in Afghanistan by 33,000 troops by next summer, there will still be 67,000 U.S. servicemen deployed there—double the number we had in country when Obama took office! In addition there are presently 40,000 other coalition forces in country, although how long they will stay given our force reduction is questionable.

American strategy will now hinge increasingly on “counter-terrorism” strikes, primarily by drones, and training of Afghan security forces, with “COIN”—population-centric, counter-insurgency operations–relegated to the back seat. This is a risk for Obama, who has repeatedly stated that this is a war that must be won. However, the risks to the Presidency of pursuing an increasingly unpopular war as the 2012 elections loom appear to be even greater in the eyes of the White House.

This force reduction is not the start of any global retrenchment nor are we “running for the exits”. In view of the difficult economic conditions at home, the war weariness that has set in, and the elusive nature of victory in this far off land, the President’s decision was understandable, if not inspirational.

-      Tyrus W. Cobb

-      This will appear in the Nevada Appeal Friday, June 24.

Former CIA clandestine services officer Brian Fairchild claims that following the demise of the Soviet Union in 1991, the NCA’s (National Command Authority) interest in strategic intelligence diminished. Budgets—especially for Humint (human intelligence)– dropped sharply, and covert operations increasingly depended on receiving intel from friendly foreign services as opposed to developing our own indigenous sources. Too many in the clandestine service operated out of Headquarters at Langley—being deployed in areas of concern and grooming sources became increasingly a lost art.

Fairchild talks about “Field forward”, having assets and personnel in place overseas. “You cannot understand people, much less influence them, from Langley”, he opines. “You cannot develop deep and trusting relationships with individuals and with governments overseas by flying in and flipping out a U.S. passport”, he charges. He laments the current practice of “surging” operators to the field instead of having “an established presence”.

Washington Post op-ed writer David Ignatius adds to this theme by noting the rapid rise in the Bush 43 years of the Pentagon moving in to areas that had traditionally been the province of the CIA. US Special Forces units began operating secretly abroad, Secretary Rumsfeld created a vast intelligence empire of his own under Steven Cambone, and the Pentagon authorized having forward-deployed Special Forces units overseas.

The CIA became alarmed that is turf was being further compromised, and directed even more of its limited resources be focused on tactical, paramilitary, anti-insurgent operations. They saw their “paltry” para-military capabilities being dwarfed by the Pentagon’s armada—Delta Force, Rangers, SEALs, Marine SOF, and Army Special Forces. The result is that broad, “strategic intelligence” has been relegated to a minor place in the Intel Community’s efforts. There is concern that the appointment of GEN David Petraeus will only accelerate this shift to tactical, paramilitary ops.

I asked two of our own experts to comment on these opinions, former CIA “COO” Rae Huffstutler and former National Intelligence Officer Keith Hansen (both now in Incline), anticipating they would have some agreement and some differences. I was right.

Keith agrees with many of Fairchild’s key points, but has serious disagreements over much of the opinion piece. He believes that “Fairchild’s analysis is too narrow and lacks balance, and is too extreme and not supported by the facts.”  Keith believes that the CIA, and much of the rest of the US Intelligence Community, save military intelligence elements, continues to be focused on strategic issues that go well beyond tactical support to military operations.

The Agency did suffer from a sudden removal of its primary focus when the USSR disappeared, the primary target of its analyses and activities for decades. Further, Hansen points out, seeking the elusive “peace dividend”, the CIA suffered a severe cut in finances (as did the Pentagon). This resulted in essentially “gutting” the clandestine services. Hansen notes that the Agency had to fight hard to keep its technical resources trained on Russia, “knowing that the future of the new state was uncertain and its nuclear arsenal was still capable of destroying the U.S.”. He adds that the potential proliferation of Soviet nuclear weapons and materials was a deep concern to him.

Keith says that the CIA’s prized National Photographic Interpretation Center was transferred to Pentagon responsibility, increasing concern “that future imagery collection and analytic efforts would be focused too much on tactical military targets vice those targets that would support warning and strategic intelligence analysis”.

Hansen also observes that the reduction of funding resulted in “some tough decisions regarding which assets to keep”. The focus naturally shifted to “areas that were hot”; that is, of current interest, to the detriment of “being able to warn of tomorrow’s crises”. It also meant that the ability to “unilaterally recruit agents” and get first-hand knowledge was limited, both by exclusionary policies (e.g., Iraq) and budget cuts. The Agency found itself at a disadvantage in not having assets on the ground, but also because CIA’s personnel “were not well postured to provide the tactical, battlefield intelligence needed to support U.S. involvement in regional conflicts”.

Rae reinforces the points Keith made, noting that the tension between demands for “current” vice in-depth analyses is not a new phenomenon. After the collapse of the USSR, the Community endured a “period of drift”, in which “neither the White House nor the Congress were focused on new strategic issues, and during which neither would respond to requests for guidance on new priorities—I know, because I was the one asking”. He adds that while the clandestine services were reduced in this period, actually the cutbacks in analysis were much greater.

Huffstutler continues that many of the most advanced technical systems and techniques that were developed against the USSR at the Agency have subsequently been transferred to the Pentagon. These resources are increasingly used by the military to support current operations, leaving the CIA with some limited Humint capabilities.

Rae points out that “supporting operations in wartime” has always “commanded the largest share of our resources”. Inevitably the Agency could not provide all of the information tactical forces requested, some of which related to areas beyond the ground Commanders field of responsibility.

The Agency today also continues to look at issues of warning, arms proliferation, economic espionage, trade issues and political developments across a wide spectrum. This in addition to being very involved increasingly in paramilitary and tactical operations, sometimes working with and sometimes at odds with the Pentagon’s elements.

This is not to say that the para-military community writ large cannot combine its assets and talents to work well together. This was shown in the May 2 raid that killed OBL. Oversight came from the CIA; the Army Spec Ops aviation units flew the troops into Abbottabad; and the Navy’s SEAL 6 team provided the firepower.

Obviously we would benefit greatly from a future seminar on the “CIA Under Petraeus”, looking at the issues raised by Fairchild and Ignatius and illuminated by Rae and Keith’s observations. Perhaps the title is the “Possible Militarization of U.S. Intelligence”! Hope to do that soon, but Rae is on the East Coast right now and Keith is about to go on another mission in the Third World for his church activities. Maybe when the snow falls again and the two skiers are back in Incline for a spell we’ll do a session!

Tyrus W. Cobb

NSF Minister of Enlightenment

////////////

Link to the Fairchild article:  http://pajamasmedia.com/blog/the-central-tactical-intelligence-agency/

Link to the Ignatius article: Click here: Rewriting Rumsfeld’s rules – The Washington Post