Dick

Having read your book World War IV and Beyond (noting in particular the exhaustive research supporting the content), I believe it safe to say your credentials on the subject of Iran-Israel relations are beyond dispute.  And thus after reading the alarming article (theme:  an Israeli attack on Iran is inevitable) you shared with us this morning, I’d like to submit to you (AND TO YOU ONLY) a few questions.  I hope you’ll share your answers with the Forum readership but that’s your call to make.  Just for fun I’ll put them in a TRUE/FALSE format to help pin you down:-)

1.  The Obama Administration is resigned to the prospect of Iran possessing a nuclear weapon capability, quite likely while Obama is still in his first term.  TRUE/FALSE

Assume that is true because there really is very little they can do about it.  The sad truth is that there is really very little that any country can do about it.  The technology is widely known and available and any country that is willing to spend the time and money can build nuclear weapons.  They can be delayed by various means (threats, sanctions, espionage, attacks), but if they are willing to persist, they will.

2.  The U.S. has no credible military option to engage Iran–given its current military commitments elsewhere–thus will strive to the extreme to avoid a confrontation in any situation short of a direct Iranian attack on U.S. interests in the Gulf region. TRUE/FALSE

True.  We can bomb them (Victory through Airpower!!), but, first that is aggression (a violation of international law) and second, unless we can totally remove the regime, it would only delay any program and have the disadvantage of uniting the country (and perhaps the entire Muslim world) behind their “sovereign right” to have nukes.  There are enough crazy war hawks who would support a “surgical” strike on Iran, but it is very doubtful any US government would want to take on the opprobrium of destroying much of the infrastructure of Iran with the enormous civilian casualties it would entail.  We do not have the ground troops to do anything useful in Iran.

3.  The use of conventional weapons (by either the U.S. or Israel) in an attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities is not a credible option as the damage done would not effectively halt the program for more than the short-term, maybe a couple of years.  TRUE/FALSE

True.  Also true for nuclear weapons unless we destroy the country (see 2).  The Iranians learned from the Israeli attack on Osirak and they have their facilities widely separated (hundreds of miles) and deep underground.  Facilities might be destroyed or damaged, but most of the scientists and technicians would probably survive.

4.  Any attack on Iran by the U.S. and/or Israel would be followed shortly by a full-scale Hezbollah assault on Israel.  TRUE/FALSE

Quite likely true, but that would only be one of many possible responses by Iran.  HezbAllah is present in other places as well, such as Iraq and South America.  There are many American targets – both individuals and installations – worldwide they could hit.  The most critical target is the Strait of Hormuz, which Iran might try to close which would immediately affect the world economy.  US Navy ships in the Persian Gulf would be vulnerable because the Iranians have developed their “swarming tactics” by which their small fast craft can attack our ships.  They have Silkworm missiles secreted in many locations along the Gulf.  US troops in Iraq and Afghanistan would be vulnerable to attacks.  They have told the Arab leaders on the Gulf that if they are attacked, they will strike their oil installations. However, the oil weapon is a two-edged sword for them because they also need to sell their oil.  Rather than attack Arabs, they could call on the entire Muslim world to join them in a Grand Jihad against Israel and the Great Satan.

5.  Israel has the political will for a pre-emptive attack on Iran, even without active U.S. support.  TRUE/FALSE

True, but I would call it the political stupidity rather than political will.  They know that if they attack, the US will be forced to come to their aid.  The US Congress and the media will scream for the US to aid our “ally.

6.  Ahmadinejad’s widely reported threat to ‘wipe Israel off the map’ was in fact misinterpreted by the media, i.e., what he actually said was that time alone would remove Israel in its current form from the map. [Something akin to Reagan's famous remark that the communism would be consigned 'to the dustbin of history].  TRUE/FALSE

True.

7.  Even in the event of war with Iran, no U.S. president would/could re-establish the military draft.  TRUE/FALSE

Not sure about this one.  If Iran is attacked, I think we will be in a world war and the nation will have to return to a draft.

8.  UN sanctions to date are significantly altering the behavior of Iran’s ruling mullahs.  TRUE/FALSE

False.  Sanctions are a politician’s way of trying to show the public he is doing something about a problem he has no idea of how to resolve.  There are too many diverse players in this game.  The interests of Russia and China do not coincide with ours.  China needs oil and is not making enemies.  Russia is the major oil country and benefits from anything that disrupts the oil flow and raises the price of oil.

9.  The State of Israel in its current political form would likely survive world condemnation for the economic havoc wrought by a pre-emptive Israeli strike on Iran.  TRUE/FALSE

Probably true.  But if the attack resulted in a very serious weakening of the US, the future of Israel would be dim.  Israel’s future is not good.  If they do not make some serious decisions on Palestine soon, the likelihood of the continuation of the Jewish state will erode quickly.  Demographics will overcome them and force them to choose between being Jewish or being democratic.

10.  A pre-emptive Israeli attack on Iran would send the U.S. economy into a Depression.  TRUE/FALSE

Probably true.  Any attack on Iran will almost absolutely cause a leap in oil prices, which would place severe strain on an already reeling world economy.  The US is not yet out of the current mess and a new blow would likely turn this recession into a depression.

*****

There are some other points to consider.  Iran does not really need nuclear weapons.  They are strictly the trappings of a major power which Iran is and wants to be so recognized by the rest of the world.  They are mainly good for deterrence (against Israel) but of little value for actual war.  They have thoroughly developed their proxy war capability by their years of experience in Lebanon and Iraq and with the Kurds.  They do not envision normal style conventional war; Lebanon taught them that you can defeat a conventional army (Israel) by sophisticated guerrilla warfare.  They developed effective and accurate long and short range missiles, secure communications (fiber optics – no radios that can be monitored), cracked the Israeli codes, evasion by moving in small groups and hiding in the populace (negating reconnaissance by aircraft, drones and satellites), use of car and truck bombs, developed IEDS and later EFPs (explosively formed penetrators that took out Abrams tanks), etc.

Sunni leadership and the Pan Arab movement have failed and Iran sees the opportunity to seize the leadership of the Muslim world.  They have been pragmatic in dealing with Sunnis such as the Kurds in the PKK against Turkey.  Iran is now less theocratic and ideological and more calculating and pragmatic pursuing its foreign policy interests.  This is probably the most important point in that Iran should now be dealt with as another power and should be seen as a player in power politics.

One last point is that much can be accomplished via espionage and special agents.  The Israelis basically killed the Egyptian nuclear and missile program by killing German scientists.  They also killed off many who were working on various programs in Iraq.  Iran has killed off its own internal opponents overseas including Paris.  Probably as much or longer delays could be attained in Iran with similar targeted programs against scientists and technicians and some facilities.  There has evidently been some of this already.  The advantage is deniability and the preclusion of reprisals that overt attacks almost surely would invoke.

Sorry for the long answers, but it is a touchy subject because of the power of the Israel lobby and media in this country and the feeling that Israel is our great “ally” and we must stand beside this small rogue country.  That is why I think Ty should have another NSF session on Iran.

The Gods seem to be with us, as they have hyped interest in our NSF seminar tomorrow on “Israel and Iran”.

First, Israeli PM Bibi Netanyahu had a very tense and unproductive meeting with President Obama last week, a failed attempt to mend fences after a series of setbacks in U.S.-Israeli relations. Then we received an unclassified summary of an 8-day wargame at the Brookings Institution that addressed the possibility and ramifications of a surprise Israeli attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities. Finally, two respected analysts proffered their views as to how Israel might conduct a nuclear or quasi-nuclear attack on Iran.

First, Bibi’s really bad Washington visit: Here is an abridged report from a left of center Israeli newspaper, sharply critical of Netanyahu:

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. (Emil Salman)

Netanyahu leaves U.S. disgraced, isolated and weaker

Ha’aretz – Thursday – March 25, 2010

Details emerging from Benjamin Netanyahu’s visit to Washington remain incomplete, but the conclusion may nonetheless be drawn that the prime minister erred in choosing to fly to the United States last week. The visit – touted as a fence-mending effort, a bid to strengthen the tenuous ties between Netanyahu and U.S. President Barack Obama – only highlighted the deep rift between the American and Israeli administrations.

The prime minister left America disgraced, isolated, and altogether weaker than when he came.

Instead of setting the diplomatic agenda, Netanyahu surrendered control over it. Instead of leaving the Palestinian issue aside and focusing on Iran, as he would like, Netanyahu now finds himself fighting for the legitimacy of Israeli control over East Jerusalem.

At the start of his visit, Netanyahu was tempted to bask in the warm welcome he received at the AIPAC conference, at which he gave his emotional address on Jerusalem.

His speech was not radical rightist rhetoric. Reading between the lines, one could spot a certain willingness to relinquish West Bank settlements as long as Israel maintains a security buffer in the Jordan Valley.

But at the White House, the prime minister’s speech to thousands of pro-Israel activists and hundreds of cheering congressmen looked like an obvious attempt to raise political capital against the American president.

Knowing Netanyahu would be reenergized by his speech at the lobby, Obama and his staff set him a honey trap. Over the weekend they sought to quell the row that flared up during U.S. Vice President Joe Biden’s trip here two weeks ago.
Just when Netanyahu thought he had resolved the crisis by apologizing to Biden, Secretary Clinton called him up for a dressing down. His arrogant tone underscored the fact that Netanyahu believed that on the strength of his AIPAC speech, he could call the next few steps of the diplomatic dance.

But then calamity struck. At their White House meeting, instead of a reception as a guest of honor, Netanyahu was treated as a problem child, an army private ordered to do laps around the base for slipping up at roll call.

The revolution in the Americans’ behavior is clear to all. The Americans made every effort to downplay the visit. As during his last visit in November, Netanyahu was invited to the White House at a late hour, without media coverage or a press conference. If that were not enough, the White House spokesman challenged Netanyahu’s observation at AIPAC that “Jerusalem is not a settlement.”

The Americans didn’t even wait for him to leave Washington to make their disagreement known. It was not the behavior Washington shows an ally, but the kind it shows an annoyance.

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Next two interesting commentaries on a possible Israeli attack on Iran with nuclear weapons:

A respected Washington think tank(CSIS) has said that low-radioactive yield “tactical” nuclear warheads would be one way for the Israelis to destroy Iranian uranium enrichment plants in remote, dug-in fortifications.  Lead  author Tony Cordesman says that “some believe that nuclear weapons are the only weapons that can destroy targets deep underground or in tunnels”. Cordesman envisages the possibility of Israel “using these warheads as a substitute for conventional weapons” given the difficulty its jets would face in reaching Iran for anything more than a one-off sortie. Ballistic missiles or submarine-launched cruise missiles could serve for Israeli tactical nuclear strikes without interference from Iranian air defences, the report says. “Earth-penetrator” warheads would produce most damage.

Israel is widely assumed to have the Middle East’s sole atomic arsenal. Critics of the report sounded off quickly arguing that the concept of a surgical nuclear strike was pure fantasy, and would lead instead to a regional conflagration.

Another expert, Chet Nagle, argues that Israel could employ an “electro-magnetic pulse.” (EMP).

As Nagle put it recently:   “The easiest solution to the threat of Iran’s nuclear weapons program is an EMP strike.  A nuke detonated 450 kilometers over Tehran at high noon on a sunny day would not even be noticed by the folks on the ground; however, their lights would go out and everything electrical would stop, including those enrichment centrifuges.”  He adds that, “a few aircraft could then drop commando teams in the resulting darkness, chaos and lack of communications and do whatever else needs doing.  Iran then would be living in the late 19th Century.” No radiation; no blast effect.  A dividend could be, former Reagan advisor Peter Hannaford argues, that Iran’s “Greens,” the democratic reformers, would seize power. “If that were to happen, we and our allies could help the country recover from the EMP attack, with the nuclear enrichment facilities permanently shut down.” Sounds good? Maybe, maybe not, as we shall here tomorrow.

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Finally,  David Sanger in yesterday’s NYT, provides a synopsis of what happened in the 8-day wargame  that simulated a surprise Israeli attack on Iran. Metcalf and Hobbs will have much more to say about this, but here is the Sanger article:

New York Times
March 28, 2010
Pg. WK3

Imagining An Israeli Strike On Iran

By David E. Sanger

In 1981, Israel destroyed Iraq’s nuclear reactor at Osirak, declaring it could not live with the chance the country would get a nuclear weapons capability. In 2007, it wiped out a North Korean-built reactor in Syria. And the next year, the Israelis secretly asked the Bush administration for the equipment and overflight rights they might need some day to strike Iran’s much better-hidden, better-defended nuclear sites.

They were turned down, but the request added urgency to the question: Would Israel take the risk of a strike? And if so, what would follow?

Now that parlor game question has turned into more formal war games simulations. The government’s own simulations are classified, but the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution created its own in December. The results were provocative enough that a summary of them has circulated among top American government and military officials and in many foreign capitals.

For the sake of verisimilitude, former top American policymakers and intelligence officials — some well known — were added to the mix. They played the president and his top advisers; the Israeli prime minister and cabinet; and Iranian leaders. They were granted anonymity to be able to play their roles freely, without fear of blowback. (This reporter was invited as an observer.) A report by Kenneth M. Pollack, who directed the daylong simulation, can be found at the Saban Center’s Web site.

A caution: Simulations compress time and often oversimplify events. Often they underestimate the risk of error — for example, that by using faulty intelligence leaders can misinterpret a random act as part of a pattern of aggression. In this case, the actions of the American and Israeli teams seemed fairly plausible; the players knew the bureaucracy and politics of both countries well. Predicting Iran’s moves was another matter, since little is known about its decision-making process.

1. Israel attacks

Without telling the U.S. in advance, Israel strikes at six of Iran’s most critical nuclear facilities, using a refueling base hastily set up in the Saudi Arabian desert without Saudi knowledge. (It is unclear to the Iranians if the Saudis were active participants or not.)

Already-tense relations between the White House and Israel worsen rapidly, but the lack of advance notice allows Washington to say truthfully that it had not condoned the attack.

2. U.S. steps in

In a series of angry exchanges, the U.S. demands that Israel cease its attacks, though some in Washington view the moment as an opportunity to further weaken the Iranian government, particularly the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.

Telling Israel it has made a mess, Washington essentially instructs the country to sit in a corner while the United States tries to clean things up.

3. U.S. sends weapons

Even while calling for restraint on all sides, the U.S. deploys more Patriot antimissile batteries and Aegis cruisers around the region, as a warning to Iran not to retaliate. Even so, some White House advisers warn against being sucked into the conflict, believing that Israel’s real strategy is to lure America into finishing the job with additional attacks on the damaged Iranian facilities.

4. Iran strikes back

Despite warnings, Iran fires missiles at Israel, including its nuclear weapons complex at Dimona, but damage and casualties are minimal. Meanwhile, two of Iran’s proxies, Hezbollah and Hamas, launch attacks in Israel and fire rockets into the country.

Believing it already has achieved its main goal of setting back the nuclear program by years, Israel barely responds.

5. Iran sees opportunities

Iran, while wounded, sees long-term opportunities to unify its people – and to roll over its opposition parties – on nationalistic grounds. Its strategy is to mount low-level attacks on Israel while portraying the United States as a paper tiger – unable to control its ally and unwilling to respond to Iran.

Convinced that the Saudis had colluded with the Israelis, and emboldened by the measured initial American position, Iran fires missiles at the Saudi oil export processing center at Abqaiq, and tries to incite Shiite Muslims in eastern Saudi Arabia to attack the Saudi regime.

Iran also conducts terror attacks against European targets, in hopes that governments there will turn on Israel and the United States.

6. Iran avoids U.S. targets

After a meeting of its divided leadership, Iran decides against directly attacking any American targets – to avoid an all-out American response.

7. Strife in Israel

Though Iran’s retaliation against Israel causes only modest damage, critics in the Israeli media say the country’s leaders, by failing to respond to every attack, have weakened the credibility of the nation’s deterrence. Hezbollah fires up to 100 rockets a day into northern Israel, with some aimed at Haifa and Tel Aviv.

The Israeli economy comes to a virtual halt, and Israeli officials, urging American intervention, complain that one-third of the country’s population is living in shelters. Hundreds of thousands flee Haifa and Tel Aviv.

8. Israel fires back

Israel finally wins American acquiescence to retaliate against Hezbollah. It orders a 48-hour campaign by air and special forces against Lebanon and begins to prepare a much larger air and ground operation.

9. Iran plays the oil card

Knowing that its ultimate weapon is its ability to send oil prices sky high, Iran decides to attack Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, an oil industry center, with conventional missiles and begins mining the Strait of Hormuz.

A Panamanian-registered, Americanowned tanker and an American minesweeper are severely damaged. The price of oil spikes, though temporarily.

10. U.S. boosts forces

Unable to sit on the sidelines while oil supplies and American forces are threatened, Washington begins a massive military reinforcement of the Gulf region.

11. Reverberations

The game ends eight days after the initial Israeli strike. But it is clear the United States was leaning toward destroying all Iranian air, ground and sea targets in and around the Strait of Hormuz, and that Iran’s forces were about to suffer a significant defeat. Debate breaks out over how much of Iran’s nuclear program was truly crippled, and whether the country had secret backup facilities that could be running in just a year or two.

A reporter’s observations

1. By attacking without Washington’s advance knowledge, Israel had the benefits of surprise and momentum – not only over the Iranians, but over its American allies – and for the first day or two, ran circles around White House crisis managers.

2. The battle quickly sucked in the whole region – and Washington. Arab leaders who might have quietly applauded an attack against Iran had to worry about the reaction in their streets. The war shifted to defending Saudi oil facilities, and Iran’s use of proxies meant that other regional players quickly became involved.

3. You can bomb facilities, but you can’t bomb knowledge. Iran had not only scattered its facilities, but had also scattered its scientific and engineering leadership, in hopes of rebuilding after an attack.

4. No one won, and the United States and Israel measured success differently. In Washington, officials believed setting the Iranian program back only a few years was not worth the huge cost. In Israel, even a few years delay seemed worth the cost, and the Israelis argued that it could further undercut a fragile regime and perhaps speed its demise. Most of the Americans thought that was a pipe dream.

Two pieces today on Iran, one hopeful about the future and the other a somber reminder of the real nature of the current regime and those who rule it.

First, COL Tim Geraghty, who commanded the Marine detachment in Lebanon in 1983 when a suicide bomber drove a truck into the compound and killed 241 U.S. Marines. writes about the horrors of that catastrophe. However, the op-ed really directs our attention to the pervasive influence of the Iranian regime and the multiple subordinate and allied entities that Tehran directs in its global terror activities.
Geraghty’s piece is a reminder that those of us who feel that some form of U.S.-Iranian rapprochement is in the interest of both countries must temper our ambitious strategies. However, the second article (abridged) speaks to the chasm that now exists between the ruling “Mullah-Military” elite and the young, well educated next generation–a group that constitutes a vast majority of the population. The article gives hope that despite the oppressive regime now in power, that its days may be numbered.

– Ty

New York Post
October 23, 2009
Deadly Anniversary: Remembering ’83 Beirut attack
By Timothy J. Geraghty

AT 6:22 on Sunday morning, 26 years ago today, a huge explosion rocked my headquarters at Beirut International Airport, where the US Multinational Peacekeeping Force had been operating for more than a year. It was followed by enormous shock waves, sending equipment, papers and shards from blown-out windows flying. The office entry door had been blown off its hinges.
Outside, through a dense fog of ash, I saw the Battalion Landing Team’s four-story headquarters demolished. A suicide driver had penetrated our southern perimeter, rammed a 19-ton Mercedes truck bomb into the lobby of the building and detonated it. A similar truck bomb struck the French paratrooper HQ at Ramlet-el-Baida minutes later, killing 58 French peacekeepers.
The death toll eventually reached 241 Marines, sailors and soldiers — my men. It was the highest loss of life in a single day since D-Day on Iwo Jima in 1945. The coordinated, dual suicide attacks — supported, planned, financed and organized by Iran and Syria using Shiite proxies — achieved their goal: the withdrawal of the Multinational Force from Lebanon and a dramatic change in US policy.
The synchronized attacks had killed a total of 299 US and French peacekeepers and wounded scores more. The cost to the Iranian-Syrian supported operation was two suicide bombers dead. This was the beginning of the asymmetrical war radical Islamists waged against America and our allies. It has evolved today to be the major national-security threat to Western civilization.
Perhaps the most significant development that grew out of our Beirut mission was Iran’s ascent. Since Iran doesn’t share a border with Lebanon or Israel, in the early 1980s it deployed a contingent of its Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps into Lebanon’s Bekaa Valley. There, the Iranians established an operational and training base that is active to this day. Having created a state within a state, they founded, financed, trained and equipped Hezbollah to operate as a proxy army and used these Shiite surrogates to attack the US and French peacekeepers that October morning.
Iran’s entry into Lebanon was a game-changer. With Syrian complicity, Iran still destabilizes Lebanon and attacks Israel indirectly, which raises its stature, popularity and influence throughout the Arab region and globally. Today Iran is capable of causing havoc on several fronts and on its own schedule, which provides convenient distractions while its nuclear centrifuges spin.
Shiite Iranian mullahs, looking to fuel instability, support al Qaeda, Hamas, Hezbollah and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, even though three of these groups are Sunni. They also back the Taliban in Afghanistan against NATO forces and use the IRGC’s elite Quds Force to train, finance and equip Sunni and Shiite militias in Iraq.
Recent events offer insight into US-Iranian relations. With August’s Iranian election in dispute, the Obama administration was able to engage Iranian leaders only by ignoring those who risked their lives to protest the election’s illegitimacy. On cue, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad increased his challenges of Israel’s right to exist, while deflecting attention from the carnage in Tehran’s streets. Notably, Iran brought IRGC-trained Hezbollah thugs from Lebanon to subdue the protestors.
Meanwhile, some leaders implementing the mullahs’ policies hearken back to the Beirut days. Mostafa Mohammad-Najjar, a veteran commander of the 150,000-man IRGC, was named defense minister in 2005. Najjar was commander of the IRGC contingent in the Bekaa Valley in 1983 and was directly responsible for the truck bombings. Najjar’s ideological loyalty is exceeded only by the butchery he has wrought.
Gen. Ahmad Vahidi, Ahmadinejad’s choice as the new defense minister, also took part in the Beirut attack and later succeeded Najjar as commander. Recognized by the mullahs for his successful service there, he was promoted in 1991 and founded the elite Quds Force.
Vahidi has an extensive background in intelligence operations and in special operations abroad. He’s on Interpol’s most wanted list, the Red Notices, for example, for orchestrating Hezbollah’s bombing of the Jewish Community Cultural Center in Buenos Aires in 1994, in which 85 people were killed — the worst attack on a Jewish target outside Israel since World War II. Last year, the European Union linked him to Iran’s nuclear activities. Vahidi’s assignment and background lays out a bloody road map of Iranian intentions.
Add to this the recent reports, confirmed by the Drug Enforcement Administration’s former chief of operations, that Hezbollah operatives have formed a partnership with the Mexican drug cartels, using smuggling routes to get people and contraband into the United States.
At dawn today, Beirut veterans and families and friends of those killed in the bombings were scheduled to gather for a candlelight vigil at the Beirut Memorial in North Carolina to honor the fallen peacekeepers. Some of us with long memories are still waiting for justice to be served on Iran and Syria, while the rest of the world awaits their next affront to humanity.
Col. Timothy J. Geraghty, USMC (Ret.), is the author of “Peacekeepers at War: Beirut 1983-The Marine Commander Tells His Story.”
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Nazila Fathi: Iran’s Politics Open a Generational Chasm

By NAZILA FATHI
NYT: October 21, 2009

TORONTO — It had been years since Narges Kalhor could talk about politics with her father, Mehdi, a senior adviser and spokesman for President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad of Iran. He advocated greater restraints on social and political expression, while she favored more freedom. Still, they had always managed to get along.

But after Iran’s disputed presidential election in June and the protests that followed, the disagreement exploded into a breach. Last week — as her father accused her of being manipulated by the opponents of the government — Ms. Kalhor, now 25, applied for refugee status in Germany.

“The difference between my generation and my parents’ generation, who are very ideological, is just increasing day by day,” she said in a telephone interview from Germany. “Their goals have not materialized, and it is our turn to lead the way.”

While Ms. Kalhor’s case has been widely publicized, she is hardly alone. Numerous children of prominent Iranians have become estranged from their powerful parents since the election, which the opposition says was rigged. Thousands more middle-class families have been divided by the generational chasm that opened over the summer.

Mohsen Ruholamini, the son of a senior commander of the Revolutionary Guards, was arrested during the protests in July and tortured to death, according to his father, who has staunchly defended the government’s handling of the unrest.

Mehdi Khazali, the son of Ayatollah Abolghassem Khazali, a senior cleric close to Mr. Ahmadinejad, criticizes the country’s top leadership on his blog, drkhazali.net. At one point, he wrote that his father supported Mr. Ahmadinejad and the conservatives only because he had been “cheated, lied to and taken advantage of for his religious beliefs.”

Because of the growing alienation of young Iranians, family dynamics could be complex, particularly among the families of elite government officials. “These children are more affected by society and even Facebook and Twitter on the Internet than their families,” said Alireza Haghighi, an Iranian political analyst at the University of Toronto. “The younger generation has been very frustrated with the political situation.”