High level defense sources confirm that the drone the Iranians have displayed on TV is, in fact, an intact RQ-170 Sentinel. The capture—however it was done—is a severe blow to America’s super-secret surveillance program, leaving advanced, highly sensitive technology in the hands of an arch-enemy.

The sources also confirm that the beige-colored drone is a CIA adaptation of the craft. It is programmed to automatically return to its base of operation should it lose communication with its control central. No one is sure why it apparently “landed itself” safely in Iran, over which it was probably conducting surveillance. The Iranians claim they penetrated the drone’s internal communications and brought it down. This is highly doubtful, even should the Iranians have had Chinese or Russian “assistance”, which is also unlikely.

Why the Sentinel did not have a self-destruct mechanism is not known. It may have and the drone simply “thought” it was returning to its base of operations. Whatever, the Iranians have a golden opportunity to sell the drone intact or in pieces to certain adversaries. U.S. officials are concerned that others may be able to reverse engineer the chemical composition of the drone’s radar-detecting paint or the craft’s sophisticated optics technology that enables operators to make positive identifications of terror suspects from tens of thousands of feet high. The sensors would be very important for countries like China to exploit.

In Russia, voters, despite a fraudulent election, hand Putin a major defeat

Vladimir Putin’s “United Russia” party suffered a major setback at the polls, potentially losing its parliamentary majority just months before Putin seeks to return to the Presidency. The results will likely force the Party to form a coalition with opposition parties. United Russia garnered at best 47% of the vote, compared to its 64% in the previous election four years ago, and probably would have been much less if the authorities hadn’t resorted to ballot stuffing and illegal voting.

The election has emboldened the opposition, which has staged huge rallies and parades in Moscow, this time with the grudging permission of the authorities. Putin himself has been booed when he has made public appearances, something that he claims—as only a former KGB officer could suggest—was the result of American “meddling” in Russia (specifically Secretary of State Clinton).

Before anyone starts rejoicing, keep in mind that the major beneficiaries of United Russia’s fall have been the Communist Party, and the strongly nationalist Liberal Democratic Party led by the erratic Vladimir Zhirinovsky. So far those reaping the fruits of Putin and Medvedev’s downturn have not been the forces advocating for greater democracy and liberalization, although corruption and nepotism have been a focus. So far this is not a “Russian Spring”, perhaps more a “Russian revanchism” (return to the days of a “strong leader”?), but hold on—this shift is far from over.

Europe avoids a collapse—for now—but the debt crisis is far from solved

The 27-nation European Union summit ended with a band-aid being placed on the continent’s economic crisis, enough to get by for now but far less than what is necessary to seriously address Europe’s burgeoning debt crisis. While some breathed a sigh of relief that a global economic meltdown was averted, in fact the EU tried—and failed—to come up with a grand plan to fix the underlying fundamental challenge. At best they kicked the can down the road for a few months. That’s all.

The only “concrete” result of the Summit was a pledge—nothing more—to work towards a new treaty binding them together in an effort to save the Euro. Leaders have tried, and repeatedly have failed, to come up with a solution to the debt crisis, especially among the southern “PIGS”—Portugal, Greece, Spain and Italy. The pact that emanated from this meeting is very complicated, may require national referendums to pass, must be accomplished in a matter of months when it has taken years in the past to achieve even modest changes, and must overcome powerful employee unions’ opposition to any austerity measures.

The big winner, if there was one, from the meeting was Chancellor Angela Merkel, and the session signaled the growing clout of Germany. At the same time it marked a further distancing of the United Kingdom from the Continent and the increasing isolation of Britain from Europe—much of that due to PM David Cameron’s refusal to join in the commitment to a new treaty. Cameron himself sought a face-saving compromise, one that would allow him to satisfy the intense anti-Europe sensitivities of his Conservative Party. Cameron had incurred the wrath of his own party back home by suggesting the UK should be helpful in assisting its neighbors save the Euro. Ironically, Cameron is very much in synch with Germany and France as a leading advocate of austerity that Merkel and Sarkozy are pushing.

Both Merkel and Sarkozy said they had no interest in trying to placate Cameron and the UK. As a result, Britain is even further isolated in Europe.

The net result of the Summit is that the crisis has once again been delayed, Germany—and to a lesser extent France—has solidified its leadership and dominant position in European economic issues, Britain is even more isolated, and the countries on the southern rim must take domestically impossible austerity measures to reduce spending and rein in government employee compensation. Hmm—sound familiar?

JCS Chairman Dempsey reiterates that the most critical security issue is the Economy

Former Chairman of the JCS Admiral Mike Mullen raised some eyebrows when he stated explicitly that the biggest threat facing the U.S. was the national debt. This week the current Chairman, Army General Marty Dempsey, extended that worry further by saying that today “We are extraordinarily concerned about the health and viability of the euro….because of the potential for civil unrest and the breakup of the European Union”. Wow—very unusual for a CJCS, to say the least.

The comments illustrate two points. First, one would expect the country’s top military man to comment on global terrorism threats, the military challenges in the Mideast, or what rogue nations like North Korea or Iran do. Here the Chairman is again saying that the economy and particularly the debt crisis, are at the top of the challenges we face. Second, his focus illustrates that the European economic crisis is also an unexpected concern and focus of our military commanders—the health of the economies of our key allies.

The national budget has also fixated the top military and civilian leadership at the Pentagon. Not surprisingly, since the failure of the so-called “Super Committee” means that the stipulations proscribed in the Budget Control Act passed by Congress now come into play. This “sequestration” means that government spending will be automatically cut by $1.2 trillion in 2013, with the axe falling primarily on the Defense Department. In addition to the $350 billion of cuts already agreed on, DOD could lose up to another trillion dollars—nearly a fifth of the total—from its projected spending plans through 2023. If that happens, according to Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta, America would have the smallest ground force since 1940, the fewest ships since 1915, and the smallest air force in its history.

Well, it’s doubtful that sequestration will actually happen, but given the paralysis that now encompasses the nation’s capital, who knows?

NRC Chairman Jaczko is causing the nation serious damage his colleagues charge? So why has he not been removed?

Even though he has been the subject of an extremely scathing report by the Inspector General of his own agency. Even though now all four of his fellow commissioners of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission say that they have “grave concerns” that the NRC Chairman, Greg Jaczko, is causing “serious damage” to the Commission and has created a horrible work environment marked by “bullying” and a total “lack of understanding”, he has not been removed.

How could this be? This is the Chairman who overrode a Technical Panel review that concluded that closing the Yucca nuclear waste repository was illegal. But he brushed aside that conclusion and ordered the Repository to be shuttered anyway. Congressman Darrell Issa says that the letter of complaint from Jaczko’s fellow commissioners shows a serious breach of trust. Commissioners and staff have complained about the Chairman’s “brusque” style, that the Commission’s staff operates in an atmosphere of intimidation, and that his behavior is “absolutely unacceptable”.

So why has he not been replaced? President Obama has the authority and has been urged to do so by Congressional representatives? How is that such incompetence, corrosive behavior, widely condemned unilateral decisions, and having created a “chilled work environment”, could permit him to stay on, you might ask. How could it be that a Chairman of a key agency who has been lambasted by his own Inspector General could stay on?

Oh, silly us. We forget that Jaczko formerly worked for SEN Harry Reid, the Majority Leader and key ally for the President’s legislative agenda, whose opposition to the Yucca repository is well known. It appears that Reid will not permit his one time lackey, or staffer, to be replaced. In fact, just today, SEN Reid labeled the charges against Jaczko as nothing but “a politically-motivated witch hunt”. Did he forget that two of the four Commissioners are Democrats appointed by President Obama?

It also appears that Nevada’s senior leadership, including SEN Dean Heller, GOV Brian Sandoval, and former SEN Dick Bryan, who heads up the state Committee on Nuclear Projects, are content to not raise any concerns and leave this corrosive individual in charge of the very important NRC, despite his demonstrated incompetence and lack of trust and support. And that’s a shame, isn’t it?

Tyrus W. Cobb

The U.S. has confirmed that it lost an RQ-170 Sentinel UAV that was the same kind reportedly used to keep watch on Osama bin Laden’s compound in Pakistan. The drone is equipped with stealth technology which allows it to fly at lower altitudes, but remain safe from anti-aircraft missiles. American sources said that the plane was flying over Western Afghanistan but they “lost control of the UAV”. It really wasn’t flying over Iran, you understand. Hmmm.

Iran claims that it either shot down the RQ-170 or managed to break into the communications system and bring it down electronically. If true that would be very worrisome, but these claims are highly doubtful. However, we do know that only six weeks ago Russia delivered the “Avtobaza” ground-based electronic intelligence and jamming system to Iran. The S-300 is more than a traditional AAA system in that it is designed to jam side-looking and fire control radars and manipulate guidance and control systems of enemy missiles and aircraft. Was this system able to break into the communications link that permits a UAV to be controlled from a remote location? So far doubtful—we think that the RQ-170 simply lost guidance and crashed in Iran. Still, if the drone did not self-destruct after losing guidance and is largely intact, this could be an intelligence windfall for Tehran.

There is growing evidence that the West is engaged in a covert war against the Iranian regime and, specifically, its nascent nuclear weapons program. According to Michael Hirsch (writing in the Dec 4 edition of the National Journal), this may include the Stuxnet virus, the blowing-up of facilities, and the assassination or kidnapping of scientists. He notes that Israel’s 1981 attack on the Osirik nuclear reactor was preceded by assassination attempts on Iraqi scientists.

In turn Iran is taking precautionary steps. The top leadership of the nuclear weapons program, such as Mohsen Fakrizadeh, are hidden way from sight, and the regime is burying its facilities deeper underground. Iran is also employing offensive tactics against the West. This includes the Revolutionary Guards’ attempt to blow up a Washington, D.C., restaurant while the Saudi Ambassador to the U.S. would be dining there. And, while less known, to also bomb the Israeli Embassy. They have stepped up their involvement in Iraq in an attempt to undermine stability there. The Quds force and other elements are funneling arms, money and supplies to militant groups throughout the world, including Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Syrian minority dictatorship, and Hamas in Gaza. Much of this has been going on for some time but the pace seems to have been picking up.

The West has employed sanctions against Iran, specifically trying to strangle its oil and petrochemical infrastructure, and has increased financial measures designed to cripple Tehran’s economic potential. At the same time, Western nations worry that applying too much pressure on the oil industry could lead to a collapse of that sector, resulting in a severe reduction in the supply of oil to the world market. They also worry that Tehran could retaliate by closing the Straits of Hormuz, through which 40% of the world’s oil trade flows.

China and Russia are likely to veto any deeper sanctions; thus, the attraction of employing covert measures against the regime.

Observers are speculating that certain Western agencies were also behind recent bombings of Iranian nuclear program sites, and have been secretly supporting the Green Movement in an attempt to further weaken the regime and spread discontent. Whether this turmoil is really driven by outside forces or reflects growing Iranian domestic discontent with the regime, the Mullahs, the Military and the Revolutionary Guards are clearly worried. It is good that they are and good that they are off balance.

I have advocated that while the U.S., Israel, and its allies should not “take the military option off the table”, there is no viable strike option on Iran that really could do much damage. It might, in fact, rally the dissidents to support the regime. The best options are to continue to increase sanctions on Tehran’s petrochemical sector, impede its financial systems, maintain secret surveillance over key areas, provide extensive support to anti-regime elements, and employ intrusive Cyberwar techniques.

–Tyrus W. Cobb
December 5, 2011

Secretary of State Clinton pledged we would take action against Iran; many observers demanded action. The problem was, short of declaring war on Tehran and being prepared to employ decisive military force, there appears to be little the United States can realistically do. In addition, after the first days of astonishment, many experts began to shy away from employing any coercion or sanctions against the Iranian regime. “Was this infantile project worth war?”, many asked.

Lee Smith, writing in the NeoCon journal, the Weekly Standard, has laid out a series of strong actions the US/West should undertake, including efforts to depose the Supreme Ruler, Ayatollah Khamenei. While I sympathize with Smith here, I am not persuaded that we have identified and can effectively execute the series of realistic actions that would be needed to destabilize Iran, assist the dissidents, and even depose Khamenei. But we certainly need to keep trying–dealing with Iran will only get more difficult as time goes by and its nuclear program nears reality.

Finally, I don’t think many of us really know much about the Supreme Leader himself. Following Smith’s op-ed, I have included a biographical sketch on Ali Khamenei, whose earlier pragmatism and conciliatory approach in contentious issues left him under attack from more fervent Islamists. The Supreme Leader today has shifted significantly, however, and now espouses strong Islamist, anti-West/US, and revolutionary rhetoric. Interesting transformation!

– Ty
http://www.weeklystandard.com/articles/tripoli-tehran_598448.html

From Tripoli to Tehran

Lee Smith

October 31, 2011, Vol. 17, No. 07

Killing Muammar Qaddafi wasn’t easy. What President Obama said would take days wound up taking eight months. At first the administration did not seem to understand that NATO’s objective of protecting the civilians rising up against the Libyan tyrant’s 40-year rule would require capturing or killing the man who was most likely to harm them. Unfortunately, the learning curve here seems to be something of a yardstick for Washington’s understanding of the Middle Eastern state most likely to kill Americans​—​the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Still, we applaud the White House for at last getting Qaddafi. His execution at the hands of Libyan rebels closes a dark chapter in history, one that saw the murder of hundreds of U.S. citizens in acts of terror sponsored and directed by Qaddafi, including most spectacularly the Lockerbie bombing in 1988. Our thoughts are primarily with the family and friends of those killed by Qaddafi’s agents. The justice they have now is final and cannot be betrayed again, as it was two years ago when Libyan intelligence officer Abdel Basset al-Megrahi was released from a Scottish prison and returned home to a hero’s welcome. Later it became clear that Megrahi’s freedom was the price the British government paid for a prospective oil deal​—​with the cost borne by the relatives of Qaddafi’s victims.

London, to be sure, played a leading role in the NATO action against Qaddafi. But the Megrahi deal should remind us that our interests do not always align with those of our allies. The point of American leadership is not only that we lead, but that we do so for the purpose of maintaining and advancing American security, especially the protection of U.S. citizens. If this is not a priority for the British, then it is certainly not going to matter to, say, the Russians and Chinese. So why is the Obama administration wasting valuable time seeking support from Moscow and China in its efforts to isolate Iran?

When one considers Qaddafi’s career of anti-American terror, a larger and even more dangerous assault on the United States becomes ever clearer: the Islamic Republic of Iran’s decades-long war against America. Given Tehran’s efforts the last several years in Iraq and Afghanistan, the clerical regime and its Revolutionary Guards cohort are perhaps responsible for more American deaths than Qaddafi. The U.S.-led coalition against Saddam Hussein compelled Qaddafi to abandon his nuclear weapons program. The Iranians have pressed on with theirs.

The White House is rightly proud to have brought down Qaddafi without risking the lives of American ground troops. Libya, the administration believes, is a new model for projecting American power. “What we’re moving towards,” says deputy national security adviser Ben Rhodes, “is a far more targeted use of force in which we apply direct power against al Qaeda and those who pose a direct threat to the United States and then galvanize collective action against global security challenges.” But that is not the way it is going to go with Iran. Instead, the United States is going to find itself in a large and destructive conflict with the Islamic Republic.

The plot to kill the Saudi ambassador in a Washington restaurant shows that the Iranians are getting bolder. The bizarre belief that the Drug Enforcement Administration, FBI, and CIA have fundamentally misconstrued the Iranian operation in its details and its provenance shows that American elites have become even more elaborate in their efforts to explain away Iranian intentions and ambitions. In effect, we’ve executed a disinformation campaign against ourselves, in which we keep saying the water that is about to come to a boil is only getting a little warmer. The Iranians, though, see it rather more clearly: The Americans have deterred themselves and will pull back even further once we’ve acquired the bomb.

Iranian aggression and American wishful thinking will bring not peace but war. Hitler was incensed with Chamberlain when the Brits finally went to war after the invasion of Poland: There was nothing in the past behavior of the allies that suggested they would ever do anything but appease the German dictator. We can imagine Iran’s supreme leader Ali Khameini will be similarly furious when we finally take action against the Iranian regime. The Americans did nothing to stop us before, they will rightly note​—​not when we bombed their embassy in Beirut and the Marine barracks, not in Iraq, not in Afghanistan, not when we plotted to kill the Saudi envoy regardless of American casualties in the U.S. capital.

One day soon, however, the Iranians will cross the line, and the American president will have no choice but to retaliate​—​even if the Iranians have the bomb. There won’t be time then for the “collective action” prized by Obama and his deputies. The time for “collective action” is now.

Collective action does not mean bringing the unmovable Russians and Chinese on board. It means going after Revolutionary Guard camps. It means destabilizing Iran’s ally Syria by creating a no-fly zone there that protects the Syrian opposition and helps bring down Bashar al-Assad. Collective action means using every possible method and tactic to destabilize the Iranian regime by working with allies inside and outside of Iran. It means doing everything possible to ensure that Ayatollah Ali Khameini, stripped of his clerical robes, is the next Middle East dictator dragged from a hole in the ground.

//////////////////////

Ayatollah Sayyid Ali Khamenei

Ayatollah Sayyid Ali Khamenei (born 1939) followed Ayatollah Rohollah Khomeini as supreme spiritual and political leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran. A favored Khomeini disciple, key revolutionary strategist, and innovative president, Khamenei was elected supreme leader by a Council of Islamic Experts on June 5, 1989.

Born in 1939, Sayyid Ali Khamenei was raised in a family of Islamic scholars in Meshed, a key city in northeast Iran. At 18 he began advanced religious training at Najaf, Iraq. Some sources claim that Khamenei also undertook limited paramilitary training in Palestinian camps in Lebanon and Libya. He moved to Qom, Iran, in 1958, where he became a close student of Ayatollah Khomeini. In 1963 Khamenei was involved in the massive student protests against the shah’s Western-oriented reforms. The protests were brutally crushed, and Khomeini was exiled. Khamenei continued his studies in Meshed, eventually achieving recognition as hojatolislam (“authority on Islam”), a rank only one step beneath ultimate esteem as an ayatollah.

Khamenei’s Farsi, Arabic, and Turkish language skills helped him as a literary critic and translator of works on Islamic science, history, and Western civilization. Khamenei’s own books include a study of “the role of Muslims in the liberation of India.”

Revolutionary Strategist

Khamenei’s teachings drew the wrath of the shah’s agents. Frequent arrests and three years of imprisonment were followed by a year of internal exile in the Baluchi desert region. Undaunted, Khamenei returned to Meshed in time to help orchestrate the nationwide street battles that resulted in the shah’s overthrow and the triumphant return of Khomeini in 1979.

Khamenei rose rapidly as the clerics gradually consolidated their control over the revolution. An original Revolutionary Council member, Khamenei cofounded the Islamic Republican Party, was designated the prestigious Friday prayer leader for the capital city of Tehran, and was elected to the Majlis (consultative assembly). Khamenei’s early tasks also included the ideological indoctrination of the shah’s military and the formation of the autonomous and ideologically driven Revolutionary Guards. Khamenei staunchly defended the militant students who held 52 American diplomats for 444 days (1979-1981). After Iraq invaded Iran, Khamenei was Khomeini’s first personal representative on the powerful Supreme Defense Council, from where he helped discredit then president Bani-Sadr for being inclined to accept Iraqi cease-fire offers. Khamenei viewed hard-line stands as beneficially producing a “born again” self-confidence in the Iranian people.

Khamenei was elected president on October 2, 1981, almost by default, since scores of top revolutionary clerics had been killed by bombs planted by the Mujahedeen-e-Khalq (Islamic-Marxist guerrillas). Khamenei himself barely survived a tape-recorder bomb; his right arm and voice remained damaged.

Presidential Years

As president, Khamenei’s authority was significantly checked by Iran’s complicated constitutional structure. Khomeini’s original choice for prime minister, Ali-Akbar Velayati, was rejected by the Majlis in favor of the independent-minded Hussein Moussavi. Like the French system, Iran’s divided executive increasingly suffered from bureaucratic confusion and tensions. Velayati, for example, became foreign minister, but many of his deputies were morebeholden to Moussavi.

Khamenei’s policy positions did not necessarily follow his earlier hard-line reputation. In social matters Khamenei tended to advocate stern social and cultural purity. Yet, he was quick to encourage skilled Iranians to return from abroad, regardless of their fidelity to revolutionary norms. In economics Khamenei’s defense of the Bazaaris (merchants) against un-Islamic socialism clashed sharply with Moussavi’s enactment of radical land and businessreforms. When such disputes became severe, the theoretically supreme Ayatollah Khomeini tended merely to endorse such “constructive debate” and to praise the loyal service of both Moussavi and Khamenei. Though Moussavi’s measures were often vetoed by Iran’s conservative Council of Guardians, some observers viewed Khamenei’s presidency as becoming ceremonial.

Khamenei’s most significant presidential contribution was in foreign policy. As Iran struggled to break its pariah status, Khamenei launched in 1984 what became known as an “open door” policy. With Khomeini’s blessing, Khamenei transformed the “neither east nor west” revolutionary slogan away from isolationism to mean neither eastern nor western domination. “Rational, sound, and healthy relations with all countries” will help Iran meet its “needs,” he said, while aiding in the non-violent spread of Iran’s revolutionary message. Khamenei insisted that reciprocity and mutual respect were Iran’s criteria for good relations, not ideological conformity. Thus, even unconverted “Satans” like the United States could become friends.

Khamenei’s “open minded policy” was frequently denounced by radical hardliners, particularly after the revelations of covert dealings with the United States. Still, the pragmatic analyses of Khamenei and Majlis speaker Rafsanjani arguably were behind Iran’s “surprise” acceptance of a cease-fire with Iraq in August of 1988. The Salman Rushdie uproar was a subsequent setback for the pragmatists. When Khamenei suggested that the condemned author could redeem himself, Khomeini publicly reversed Khamenei, saying that Rushdie could not repent from intentional blasphemy.

Supreme Leader

Despite past controversial stands, the 49-year-old Khamenei was swiftly selected as the new supreme leader after Ayatollah Khomeini’s death by an 80-member Council of Islamic Experts. The context for Khamenei’s selection had been set by Khomeini’s demotion of his previously designated successor, Ayatollah Hossein Montazeri, for his hardline international views and brazen criticisms of postwar executions of Mujahedeen leaders. Though elevated to ayatollah status, Khamenei’s credentials were challenged by more senior Islamic clergy, including Montazeri. Yet, Khamenei’s loyalty to Khomeini and his “skills gained during eight years as president” were deemed to take “priority” over religious training.

As spiritual leader, Khamenei followed Khomeini’s tendency to seek conciliation among factions. To placate the marginalized radicals, Khamenei occasionally cautioned the powerful new president, Ali Rafsanjani, not to lose sight of revolutionary principles. Yet Khamenei’s sanctioning of careful international financing of reconstruction exemplified his continued emphasis on pragmatic needs.

No longer as immersed in policy making, Khamenei’s sermons took on the air of a detached theoretical historian. Such reasoned discourses on the unique and lasting aspects of Iran’s Islamic revolution can still be displaced by fiery rhetoric. Amidst the 1990-1991 Persian Gulf crisis, Khamenei proclaimed a “Holy War” against notions of permanent U.S. bases in Saudi Arabia, even as he supported “international” efforts to remove Iraq from Kuwait.

Kamenei continued his defiance of the U.S. during the 1990s. In a ceremony marking the sixth anniversary of the death of Khomeini, he accused Washington of interfering in the affairs of Iran, saying; “It is very clear that the government of Iran is against U.S. interests.” Anything with an American flavor came under his attack. With Khamenei’s religious ruling, both Coke and Pepsi were banned in Iran. He launched a drive to make the universities more Islamic, and to increase censorship of newspapers, books, and films. While many in the public sector had little enthusiasm for continuing the revolutionary fervor, Khamenei with an extremist viewpoint attempted to keep Iran from moderating its stance. During the 1997 elections, Khamenei’s choice for president, Ali Akbar Nateq-Noori, was defeated by Mohammed Khatami in a referendum by the general public for more freedom and liberty.

Read more: http://www.answers.com/topic/ali-khamenei-1#ixzz1bbOpRUrG

Notorious Iranian militant has a connection to alleged assassination plot against Saudi envoy

By Peter Finn, Published: October 14

When nearly $100,000 landed in an undercover FBI bank account from a source linked to an Iranian paramilitary force, officials began taking seriously an alleged plot to assassinate the Saudi ambassador that at first had seemed outlandish.

And as the investigation unfolded over recent months, a name emerged that chilled some in the U.S. government. The Iranian cousin of the man accused of plotting the assassination was Abdul Reza Shahlai, a senior commander in Iran’s Quds Force, who had been linked to the killing of American troops in Iraq.

Shahlai was known as the guiding hand behind an elite group of gunmen from the feared militia of the cleric Moqtada al-Sadr. They had dressed as American and Iraqi soldiers and, in a convoy of white SUVs, stormed a provincial government building in Karbala on Jan. 20, 2007.

Five Americans were killed and three were wounded in the attack, whose brazenness rattled the military. The daring raid became even more notorious after some of the suspected killers were later released by the Iraqi government.

The U.S. military found a 22-page memo that detailed preparations for the operation and tied it to the Quds Force, a branch of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. Treasury officials singled out Shahlai as “the final approving and coordinating authority” for the Iran-based training of members of Sadr’s militia before they went back to Iraq to attack coalition forces.

The 54-year-old Iranian also supplied parts of Sadr’s militia with large quantities of C-4 plastic explosives, 122mm grad rockets, rocket-propelled grenades and mortars, according to the U.S. Treasury report targeting him for sanctions.

“The Quds Force is Iran’s arm for supporting terrorists and planning attacks. . . . It has, in the past, reached out to groups that might seem unlikely partners,” said a U.S. official, speaking on the condition of anonymity to discuss an ongoing investigation. “The U.S. government has known for quite some time that the Quds Force was involved in this type of external plotting and has known that Shahlai has been behind much of it. That he is still at it is no surprise.”

Shahlai’s cousin in the United States is Mansour Arbabsiar, who had grown up with him in the Iranian city of Kermanshah (now Bakhtaran) but emigrated to Texas in the late 1970s.

This year, the 56-year-old Arbabsiar, running from a series of failed businesses and a collapsing marriage, returned to Iran to live. And Shahlai apparently decided that he had found another proxy to strike at two of Iran’s principal enemies: the United States and Iran’s regional rival, Saudi Arabia. The Saudi ambassador to the United States,Adel al-Jubeir, is a key foreign policy adviser to King Abdullah.

U.S. officials say that Shahlai hoped that Arbabsiar, by virtue of his time in Texas, might be able to get in touch with Mexican drug traffickers who would kidnap Jubeir. The plan allegedly later evolved into assassinating him in Washington.

It is unclear how much Shahlai understood about his cousin’s life in the United States and if he understood how unlikely it was that a struggling used-car salesman in Corpus Christi, Tex., could successfully orchestrate a high-profile international plot.

Arbabsiar was charged with conspiracy to murder a foreign official and conspiracy to commit an act of international terrorism, among other charges. His court-appointed attorney said he will plead not guilty.

Several former friends of Arbabsiar’s said in interviews that he was hopelessly disorganized. Shahlai may have not known, or he may have not cared. In either case, his cousin “was a throwaway,” said one U.S. official.

Arbabsiar allegedly told Shah­lai that he might have a connection. He gave Arbabsiar several thousand dollars to return to the United States and get to Mexico, according to U.S. law enforcement officials and court papers.

The alleged plot began to unravel when Arbabsiar attempted to find a contact in the Mexican underworld. Officials said he believed that the nephew of a female friend was a member of Los Zetas, a group formed by ex-Mexican soldiers that acted as an enforcer for the gulf drug cartel before the two groups split in a violent feud. But the nephew, in fact, was a Drug Enforcement Administration informant.

Both the gulf cartel and Los Zetas have been the target of investigations by a DEA strike force operating out of Houston. “Over the past two years, DEA Houston has developed several highly placed confidential sources with direct access to key leadership elements of the cartels,” said a federal law enforcement official.

On May 24, Arbabsiar traveled from Texas to Reynosa, Mexico, to meet with the informant. Arbabsiar allegedly spoke about attacking the Saudi Embassy and asked the informant what he knew about explosives.

In two more meetings in Mexico in July, the informant recorded the conversation as Arbabsiar described his cousin as someone who was “wanted in America” and had been on CNN.

“He’s got the, got the government behind him,” said Arbabsiar, according to court papers. “He’s not paying from his pocket.”

Arbabsiar said he told his cousin that he wanted “another fifteen,” presumably $15,000.

“Next morning, they send one guy, you know, that work for him. He’s like a colonel, the guy,” Arbabsiar said. “He bring the envelope.”

The colonel was Ali Gholam Shakuri, Shahlai’s deputy. Arbabsiar and Shakuri, speaking in code, referred to the plot as buying a Chevrolet.

But Arbabsiar was arrested in New York on a flight from Mexico, where he had been refused entry. He telephoned Shakuri, who also was charged, as federal officials recorded the conversation.

“So buy it, buy it,” said Shakuri.

“Buy it? Okay,” Arbabsiar said.

“Buy it, yes. Buy all of it,” said Shakuri.

Staff researcher Julie Tate contributed to this report.

Iran’s goal seem to be the promotion of perpetual chaos in every struggle, giving it a decided advantage in being able to control the flow of events. The last thing Tehran wants is stability in the region, especially in Iraq.

The first piece is particularly important, on Qassem Suleimani, the head of the powerful Quds force in Iran whose span of control is so great that he is regarded as the “most powerful man in Iraq” (yes, Iraq) and the prime mover behind Iran’s export of terror and violence.

All three worth perusing–especially the first on Suleimani.

Ty

Qassem Suleimani: the  Iranian general ‘secretly running’ Iraq

Martin Chulov reports on the elusive Iranian with so much Iraqi influence that Baghdadis believe he is controlling the country.

• Martin Chulov in Baghdad
• guardian.co.uk, Thursday 28 July 2011 23.58 BST

Members of the Promised Days Brigade on the march in the Sadr City district of Baghdad. The militia – one of two under Qassem Suleiman’s control – is still killing US soldiers. Photography Ahmad Al-Rubaye/AFPThere’s a story that the new CIA director, David Petraeus, likes to tell which harks back to his days as a four-star general in Iraq.

Early in 2008, during a series of battles between the US and Iraqi army on one side and the Shia militias on the other, Petraeus was handed a phone with a text message from the Iranian general who had by then become his nemesis.

The message came from the head of Iran‘s elite al-Quds Force, Qassem Suleimani, and was conveyed by a senior Iraqi leader. It read: “General Petraeus, you should know that I, Qassem Suleimani, control the policy for Iran with respect to Iraq, Lebanon, Gaza, and Afghanistan. And indeed, the ambassador in Baghdad is a Quds Force member. The individual who’s going to replace him is a Quds Force member.”

and the client militias of the Iranian general’s al-Quds force.Petraeus hardly needed to be told. Much of the US military‘s work with Iraq’s Shia Muslims had been undermined by Suleimani So too had US government diplomatic efforts elsewhere in the Middle East, especially in Lebanon.

Petraeus last year told a thinktank, the Institute for the Study of War, about the problem Suleimani created for him: “Now, that makes diplomacy difficult if you think that you’re going to do the traditional means of diplomacy by dealing with another country’s ministry of foreign affairs because in this case, it is not the ministry. It is a security apparatus.”

As he prepared for the job of the US’s most senior spy, Petraeus would surely have been preparing for further shadow boxing. Suleimani’s reputation as the most formidable operator in the region has not diminished in the past three years. By some measures it has actually increased: Syria now also comes within Suleimani’s sphere of influence.

Qassem SuleimaniThe strength of the ties between Suleimani and Iraqi legislators has been revealed during weeks of interviews with key officials, including those who admire him and those who fear the man like no other.

Iraq’s former state security minister, Sharwan al-Waeli is one who knows Suleimani well. A formal conversation between the Guardian and al-Waeli last year took on a very different tone as soon as Suleimani’s name was mentioned.

The Shia legislator was a known ally of Iran, so much so that he was seen by secularists and Sunnis in parliament as someone prepared to do Iran’s bidding. He denied Iran played a pervasive role in Iraq until he was interrupted with a question that Iraqi officials have long prefered to ignore: when was the last time Qassem Suleimani came to the Green Zone, the fortified government district in the heart of Baghdad?

Al-Waeli’s left hand trembled slightly and his brow furrowed. “You mean Sayed Qassem Suleimani,” he said, giving Suleimani an Arabic honorific reserved for the most esteemed of men. He refused to elaborate.

In Baghdad, no other name invokes the same sort of reaction among the nation’s power base – discomfort, uncertainty and fear.

“He is the most powerful man in Iraq without question,” Iraq’s former national security minister, Mowaffak al-Rubaie, said recently. “Nothing gets done without him.”

Until now, however, few Iraqis have dared to talk openly about the enigmatic Iranian general, what role he plays in Iraq and how he shapes key agendas like no one else.

“They are too busy dealing with the aftermath,” said a senior US official. “He dictates terms then makes things happen and the Iraqis are left managing a situation that they had no input into.”

Suleimani’s journey to supremacy in Iraq is rooted in the Islamic revolution of 1979, which ousted the Shah and recast Iran as a fundamentalist Shia Islamic state. He rose steadily through the ranks of the Iranian military until 2002 when, months before the US invasion of Iraq, he was appointed to command the most elite unit of the Iranian military – the al-Quds force of the Revolutionary Guards Corp.

The al-Quds force has no equal in Iran. Its stated primary task is to protect the revolution. However, its mandate has also been interpreted as exporting the revolution’s goals to other parts of the Islamic world.

Shia communities throughout the region have proved fertile grounds for revolutionary messages and have formed deep and abiding partnerships with the al-Quds force. So too have several Sunni groups opposed to Israel – first among them Hamas in Gaza.

But Iraq has been Suleimani’s key arena. The last eight years have witnessed a proxy war between Suleimani’s Quds force and the US military, the full effects of which are still being played out, as the US prepares for a full departure from Iraq and Iraq’s leaders ponder over whether to ask them to stay.

Arabian heartland

At stake is no less than who gets to shape the destiny of the heartland of Arabia. “His power comes straight from (the country’s lead cleric Ayatollah) Khamenei,” said one of Iraq’s three deputy prime ministers, Saleh al-Mutlaq, a secular Sunni. “It bypasses everyone else, including Ahmadinejad.

“There is a saying in Islam that you should never get angry with your father or mother. The [Shia] interpret that as meaning what (Khamanei, via Suleimani) says has to be respected by every [Shia] inside, or outside Iran.

“All of the important people in Iraq go to see him,” said Mutlaq. “People are mesmerised by him – they see him like an angel.”

A second MP – a senior member of Prime Minister Nour al-Maliki’s inner circle who regularly meets Suleimani in Iran – said the general has only travelled once to Iraq in the past eight years. He described him as “softly spoken and reasonable, very polite”. “He is simple when you talk to him. You would not know how powerful he is without knowing his background. His power is absolute and no one can challenge this.”

Silver-haired, slight and with a perennial serene smile, Suleimani comes across as the most unlikely of warlords. Those who met him during the one time he traveled to Baghdad at the height of the 2006 sectarian conflict say he walked around the compounds of his two key hosts without bodyguards. The Americans did not know he had been in the capital until he was back in Iran and were deeply unhappy to learn that their arch enemy had been among them.

“He is indeed like Keyser Söze,” said a senior US official this week – in reference to the legendary villain in the The Usual Suspects, whose ruthlessness and influence terrified everyone. “Nobody knew who he was and this guy’s the same. He is everywhere, but nowhere.”

The senior Shia MP added: “He has managed to form links with every single Shia group, on every level. Last year, in the meeting in Damascus that formed the current Iraqi government, he was present at the meeting along with leaders from Syria, Turkey, Iran and Hezbollah. “He forced them all to change their mind and anoint Maliki as leader for a second term.”

Over the five years that Maliki has been in power in Iraq, all his key advisers have been granted court in Iran by Suleimani. Iraq’s president, a Kurd – Jalal Talabani, has also regularly met the general, sometimes along the border separating both countries.

The Syrian uprising has added a new dimension. The al-Quds Force has been involved in suppressing the Syrian uprising, according to multiple sources inside and outside the country.

The US has slapped personal sanctions on Suleimani and two other generals in the Iranian security forces who it accuses of helping orchestrate the crackdown that is believed to have killed more than 1,600 civilians.”

Tehran has heavily invested in the survival of embattled Syrian president Bashar al-Assad, whose ruling Allawite clan has links to Shia Islam. Assad’s fall would be a serious strategic setback for Iran and Suleimani. It is perhaps the only part of the region where the general’s preferred mix of strategic diplomacy with aggressive operations is being strongly tested.

In the meantime, the work of the al-Quds force continues in Iraq. All but two of the US troops killed in June – the highest number in more than two years, were killed by client militias directly under Suleimani’s control, the Keta’ib Hezbollah and the Promised Day Brigades.

“It is clear that the al-Quds force is responsible,” said the director general of the intelligence division in Iraq’s interior ministry, Hussein Kamal. “There has been a systematic flow of weapons into Iraq for the past eight years. Of course they try to say it is not state-sponsored. But when weapons are flowing from the borders of a sovereign state, it is very clear where the blame lies.

“They are destructive weapons and they cannot deny the responsibility for them.”

Another Shia MP said he had personally asked Suleimani why his al-Quds force continued to smuggle weapons, many of which are fired into the Green Zone, where he and most of Maliki’s inner circle live. “He just smiled and said it is nothing to do with me,” the MP said. “He said he had no idea where the weapons were coming from.”

Suleimani has been variously described by those who dislike him – Iraq’s Sunnis, and those who have spent years trying to get his measure – as a “talented extortionist” and a highly skilled wheeler-dealer.

US officials who have spent years trying to disrupt the work of his loyalists say they would like to meet him, while at the same time being puzzled as to his objectives.

“I would simply ask him what he wants from us,” said a senior US military official. In addition to the soldiers killed this year, the US ambassador in Baghdad, James Jeffrey, said last summer that Iranian proxies accounted for roughly a quarter of US combat casualties in Iraq – around 1,100 deaths and many thousands more injuries.

Despite this, the US has landed few public blows on Suleimani’s close circle.

In March 2007, the British SAS captured a senior Hezbollah official, Ali Moussa Daqduq, who had allegedly planned an operation that killed seven soldiers in Karbala. The same year, US troops also captured two men in the Kurdish north who they believed were al-Quds leaders. Apart from that, the trophy cabinet remains bare – at least publicly. More troubling than the apparent dearth of tactical victories is how the rest of the year will play out.

The US – and some key neighbouring Sunni states – believe Iran’s strategy in Iraq as the conflict winds down is to keep the country in a permanent but manageable state of chaos.

“They keep it on simmer and turn it up and down when they want to,” said one Lebanese official in Beirut.

The senior US military spokesman in Iraq, Major General Jeffrey Buchanan agreed. “Their overall strategy has been to keep [Iraq] isolated from the rest of its neighbours and from the US, because that makes it likely that it will depend on Iran. They want Iraq to play a subordinate, weak role.”

Only Iraq’s lawmakers can stop the master-client relationship from becoming entrenched here. It’s a task that Kurdish legislator in the national parliament, Mahmoud Othman, fears may prove to be beyond his colleagues.

“Qassem Suleimani is the key man to every decision taken in Iraq,” he said.

“It is a shame to have such a man playing such a role in this country. There should be a relationship between equals like normal relations with normal states.”

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