Has the Central Intelligence Agency become the

Tactical Intelligence Agency?”

 With

 Rae Huffstutler

Former Executive Director, the CIA

 And other Intel community veterans

The Ramada Inn, Thursday, February 9, 9:00 am

Increasing attention has been directed at a covert intelligence war and paramilitary activities that have become a key part of American national security strategy. To a great extent implementation of this approach relies heavily on U.S. military Special Operations Forces and the paramilitary arm of the Central Intelligence Agency. The new warfare the CIA is engaged in is heavily dependent on the use of unmanned armed aircrafts (drones) and covert operations in key areas of concern – Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia, and elsewhere. This has led some observers to assert that the CIA has relegated its decades long principle focus on strategic analysis to a secondary position as it becomes, in essence, “The Tactical Intelligence Agency”.

We are fortunate to have Rae Huffstutler with us for this discussion. A graduate of U.C. Berkley with a degree in Economics, he joined the CIA in 1958 and spent much of his career analyzing the USSR. He headed up the Soviet division and was the Director of the National Photographic Interpretation Center (NPIC). Huffstutler’s last assignment was as the Executive Director (COO) of the CIA. In those roles he guided the Agency’s evolution in technical collection and analysis and the rise of the CIA as the preeminent analytical and estimate agency (diminishing the role of the military services).

 We will use a different format for this session – more a “Meet the Press” style interview. We will want to ask Rae about the role of the CIA in developing Soviet estimates, the increasing importance of overhead photography, the tension between policy makers and analysts, and specific activities. This will include addressing the charge that the Agency now and in the past has been engaged in “targeted assassinations”, previously by such means as phony cigars but today through the employment of UAVs, Special Forces, and “cyber intrusion”.

  We will also get comments from some veterans of the Intelligence community who are part of our NSF. Please join us for what will most certainly be an informative and provocative discussion.

 Please RSVP (ACCEPTANCES ONLY)by clicking this link or by calling 746-3222. A complete breakfast will be served. There will be a $15 dollar charge at the door for the presentation and breakfast. We recommend arriving by 8:30 to enjoy some pre-presentation food and conversation.

]]> http://nationalsecurityforum.net/meetings/nsf-meeting-february-9th-militarization-of-the-cia/feed/ 0 http://nationalsecurityforum.net/domestic-news/homeland-security/the-defense-strategic-guidance-what%e2%80%99s-new-what-is-the-focus-is-it-realistic/ http://nationalsecurityforum.net/domestic-news/homeland-security/the-defense-strategic-guidance-what%e2%80%99s-new-what-is-the-focus-is-it-realistic/#comments Sun, 08 Jan 2012 18:51:12 +0000 Maria http://nationalsecurityforum.net/?p=738 Continue reading →]]> President Obama went to the Pentagon to announce the Defense Department’s new “Strategic Guidance”, the document that will serve as the template for weapons acquisition, force sizing, military strategy, budgeting, and geographic focus for the future. It is highly unusual for the President to personally announce the new guidance, but it was clear that Obama wants everyone to understand that, however controversial (and it is), this is the document that will drive force reductions, mission realignments and procurement for the next decade.

The new Defense Guidance is being driven first and foremost by the fiscal crisis. The 2011 budget agreement requires the Pentagon to reduce spending by $487 billion, with $263 billion of that over the next five years! And that’s only if “sequestration” isn’t implemented in FY 2013, a move that would require another $600 billion in cuts!

Geographic and mission shifts

The Guidance shifts the focus of military planning to the Asia-Pacific area, calls for deep reductions of Army and Marine ground forces in favor of air and naval forces, abandons the “2-war” capability concept, and says good-bye to nation building and counter-insurgency operations.

Specifically, the Army will be reduced to 490,000 troops from 570,000 and the Marines to 175,000 from 202,000. The President and Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta justified the downsizing by emphasizing that the U.S. is now “looking beyond the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan”, and is unlikely to be engaged again in long-term nation building with substantial ground force commitments. The document directly states that “U.S. forces will no longer be sized to conduct large-scale, prolonged stability operations”.  The Pentagon leadership hastened to add that we would retain the “know how” to conduct COIN operations if necessary and the ability to “regenerate” appropriate force levels if required. That might be very hard to achieve.

Panetta said the U.S. will increase its power projection capabilities, “focus on enhanced presence”, capitalize on our “technological edge”, maintain a force that is flexible, adaptable and nimble, and, above all, be cost effective. Hmm?  Does this sound like Don Rumsfeld 10 years ago?

Geographically, the shift of emphasis to the “Asia-Pacific” theater portends a major rethinking of our base and force presence in Europe. Look for a major drawdown of our presence there and a demand that our allies take on more of the regional commitments as well as assisting in our global responsibilities. This all makes strategic sense given the low threat level presently in the European theater.

The enhanced presence will mainly be in the waters south of east Asia, but not with respect to Korea, ironically considering the turmoil in Pyongyang following the death of Kim Jong Il. Nor does it say anything about Japan. The focus is on China and the oceans and seas nearby.

The Guidance is quite clear with respect to the abandonment of any pretense of maintaining the ability to fight two major contingencies simultaneously. In reality we lost that option years ago, if we ever really had it, but this is the first time that it has been acknowledged. We now will have the ability to fight one major war, while handling other minor contingencies. Realistic.

What is driving the new focus of the Guidance clearly are concerns over the growing military might of China and what is seen as the PRC’s expansionist goals in the South China Sea and beyond. Thus in place of the “Air-Land Battle” doctrine of the Cold War era, the Defense Guidance emphasizes the priority that the “Air-Sea Battle” doctrine now has.

What are the weapon choices for implementing this guidance?

The President stated that “We will continue to get rid of outdated Cold-war systems, so that we can invest in the systems for the future”. What might these weapons be? Probably nuclear weapons for starters, although they are relatively inexpensive. Secretary Gates already cut the buy on the F-22, thinking that there is no country that could significantly challenge our air superiority. The F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, hobbled by cost overruns and serious technical issues, might be a candidate for reduced purchases. Ironically, given the stress on power projection, the Pentagon also plans to reduce our aircraft carriers from 11-10 (probably reflecting valid conclusions that the Chinese will soon have missile capabilities to take out carriers and surface ships rather quickly).

Cyber warfare is highlighted often in the Guidance, so expect significant increases in denial capability as well as offensive cyber intrusion capabilities. Look for an expansion of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) like the Predator drones, which have become a mainstay of our counter-terrorism operations and will be more fully integrated into war planning for major contingencies.

Any capability that enhances the work of Special Operations forces will be given a high priority since CIA-JSOC forces and requirements will receive more attention. In countering threats in places like Yemen, Somalia, or even Pakistan, the direction will favor the employment of aerial drones and Special Operations forces. They are cheaper and less politically intrusive.

The Defense Guidance comes under quick and heavy criticism

Critics were quick to dump on the new Guidance. Some feel the focus on a singular threat (China) in place of “strategic pluralism” fails to anticipate where threats may arise. They note that we have been very weak in forecasting where U.S. forces might need to be committed over the past 20 years, and the Guidance foregoes flexibility on that front. They also point out the maintaining “multiple capabilities” complicates a potential enemy’s planning.

Nearly everyone adversely impacted by this shift has raised alarm bells, including organizations that protect military retiree and health benefits, which will certainly be reduced! Army and Marine related groups are understandably apoplectic, as are major defense firms producing weapons for the current environment or for the “Fight two major wars simultaneously” contingencies. Not too many main battle tanks to be coming off the assembly lines in the future.

In sum however, these critics fail to take under consideration the fiscal crisis the country faces. Reductions across the board are coming down the line and the Pentagon cannot be exempted. Indeed, as the President pointed out, we will continue to spend more on defense than the next 10 countries combined! And with a public mood decisively shifting away from “foreign entanglements”, the Defense Guidance does reflect political as well as economic realities.

Do you agree? For your information the Defense Guidance is attached. Take a shot at rewriting it!

Tyrus W. Cobb

Former Special Assistant to the President

For National Security Affairs

Click here: http://www.defense.gov/news/Defense_Strategic_Guidance.pdf

The cartel insurgency in Mexico continues unabated. According to the Mexican government the body count as of the end of June is 46,700 plus since just 2006. Most of the dead are cartel members and associates. However, over 1,000 Mexican police, military and political figures have been slaughtered in the course of this insurgency. The number of innocent civilians killed in the crossfire is unavailable from the government.

The Mexican federal police claim as many as 500,000 people, both Mexican nationals and American prison/street gangs, are involved in the crimes and violence. This should illustrate the magnitude of the problem, a problem that is not solely Mexico’s, but also festers within the USA.

The cartels amass billions of dollars from the drug trade, but have also branched out to people smuggling, kidnapping, extortion, plus even the ongoing theft of millions of barrels of oil from Pemex. Just a few examples of how organized crime diversifies. With this enormous money stream the seven major cartels have grown very powerful. So powerful they now ambush police and military units of platoon and company size in broad daylight and in the center of metropolitan centers. The Zeta and Sinaloa cartels have extended their reach into Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador. This has opened a huge drug smuggling corridor that originates in Colombia!

The main battle within Mexico is between cartels over control of turf and smuggling routes across Mexico and into the USA. These routes include not only drugs, but illegal immigrants (not only from Mexico but from as far way as Africa and the Middle East) and cash for money-laundering. A variety of other illegal contraband is also shipped via these routes.

Along the US/Mexican border 35 American prison gangs and sub-units, mostly Chicano but also the Afro-American Crips and Bloods , are working with the cartels as paid associates in drug and people smuggling. The networking is expansive and the distribution sites cross the USA. Nevada included. These gangs work for different cartels and as such are enemies who are also focused on controlling smuggling routes, only this time within the USA. An exception is the Barrio Azteca, which operates on both sides of the border for the Juarez cartel and provides muscle and firepower as needed in New Mexico and Texas, as well as Mexico.

To add to this problem we have the incredible fiasco of the Department of Justice’s (DOJ) “Fast and Furious” program which includes the ATF, DEA and FBI in the selling of thousands, possibly as many as 3,000, assault and sniper rifles, plus unknown amounts of handguns, to the cartels. (Refer to the latest confidential testimony before a Congressional committee on this 4^th of July weekend by the acting head of the ATF). It is my professional opinion that these weapons will be cycled through the cartels, who have many overseas sources for firearms, and many will wind up in the hands of American prison gangs who do their bidding.

Two years ago this author observed up close 3 members of the Nortenos prison gang in Reno. Tourists? I think not. I came across them a dozen times in the same place! This past week I have observed Surenos twice. Both times were also quite close up and more than a bit worrisome to me. This is more than just a passing observation! I have battled these gangs during my law enforcement career. I know what they can and will do!

The Nortenos and the MS-13 have been established in our community for some time, according to major law enforcement gang investigation units in California. Now, apparently, we have added a large, violent gang from the Greater Los Angeles – Southern California area into our backyard. All three groups are associated with different Mexican cartels which are at war with each other! Experience tells me a struggle for control of turf  in our community  may be developing. Washoe County is a perfect transit hub for drug and illegal alien trafficking due to its location on I-80. The gang/cartel that controls this vital site along a major highway would control an important part of the shipping grid that runs across the USA.

Once these gangs, backed by cartel money, take over a part of our community, it will be a long, difficult, and expensive effort to take back our streets.  I suggest the following steps that although expensive will in the long run make our streets safer is a reasonably short amount of time:

1. Station regular military forces, not national guard, at high risk drug and people smuggling sites along the southern border. (We did it in 1915 and we can do it again!) Tactically this is called “channeling.” This would force the cartels into more desolate areas or sites where the Border Patrol could then consolidate its personnel for intervention purposes. Plus it would provide necessary military backup for the BP as the cartels are now quite well armed and organized when their operations cross over our border. Bottom line, this would slow down the smuggling from Mexico and break the border linkage with US prison gangs on our side of the border who make up the major part of the cartel distribution/operations network within the USA.

2. It is time for the DOJ to stop suing the states for trying to control the illegal alien problem, which, according to DEA and border law enforcement, are often the mules who bring the drugs into our nation as payment to the cartels for entering the USA.

3. The federal government needs to utilize state/local law enforcement in combating the smuggling problem. They provide a strong back up within the states. Over 700,000 at last count! Congress needs to give these agencies legal authority to step in and enforce federal laws at the local level. Not merely be the grunts or hand maidens to federal “task forces” seeking headlines! But actually giving them the freedom and resources to attack the problem within their respective jurisdictions based on their awareness of the problem. This places the burden on local LE executives. That would put an end to kissing off the problem as a something ICE or the DOJ is responsible for. It also gives local governments the power to demand results!

4. Locally, Nevada has to form full-time (multi-agency?) prison gang investigation units. The Attorney General of California has overseen some very successful statewide anti-prison gang task forces recently. We can do it here. However, these units should not be made up of detectives sitting in front of computers, but cops in the streets seeking out the gang members who have migrated into our state and are sinking deep roots. Constant surveillance and harassment works. (I bear witness to that.)

Especially useful, dare I say it, is “profiling.” Gang members go to great pains to openly identify themselves! Applying pressure on these violent thugs day or night would include both detectives and uniform personnel. Police saturation of known gang haunts and neighborhoods is a time proven successful tactic that needs to be implemented. Yes, it would take funding, but the DOJ seems to have millions in grant funds available to spread around at their discretion, while local law enforcement agencies are being starved of money and personnel. Perhaps some neutral agency should be placed in charge of LE grants in lieu of the current organization, now embroiled in another major scandal!

5. Lastly, I would recommend the Congress investigate/overhaul the DOJ starting at the highest levels. First it was refusing to prosecute the Black Panthers, then suing states that are trying to protect themselves from illegals & cartels. And last, but for sure not the least, a DOJ that foolishly required gun retailers to sell thousand of firearms that were intended to be smuggled into Mexico, with, as could be predicted, deadly results!

Lawrence Martines

Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department (Retired)

Former Director of Homeland Security – Nevada

Some of our NSF participants would agree with Carter, Shultz, et. al., several would disagree vehemently, but the topic–which was debated at an NSF Forum last year–will be seriously considered. Ty

June 16, 2011
Call Off the Global Drug War
By JIMMY CARTER
Atlanta

IN an extraordinary new initiative announced earlier this month, the Global Commission on Drug Policy has made some courageous and profoundly important recommendations in a report on how to bring more effective control over the illicit drug trade. The commission includes the former presidents or prime ministers of five countries, a former secretary general of the United Nations, human rights leaders, and business and government leaders, including Richard Branson, George P. Shultz and Paul A. Volcker.

The report describes the total failure of the present global antidrug effort, and in particular America’s “war on drugs,” which was declared 40 years ago today. It notes that the global consumption of opiates has increased 34.5 percent, cocaine 27 percent and cannabis 8.5 percent from 1998 to 2008. Its primary recommendations are to substitute treatment for imprisonment for people who use drugs but do no harm to others, and to concentrate more coordinated international effort on combating violent criminal organizations rather than nonviolent, low-level offenders.

These recommendations are compatible with United States drug policy from three decades ago. In a message to Congress in 1977, I said the country should decriminalize the possession of less than an ounce of marijuana, with a full program of treatment for addicts. I also cautioned against filling our prisons with young people who were no threat to society, and summarized by saying: “Penalties against possession of a drug should not be more damaging to an individual than the use of the drug itself.”

These ideas were widely accepted at the time. But in the 1980s President Ronald Reagan and Congress began to shift from balanced drug policies, including the treatment and rehabilitation of addicts, toward futile efforts to control drug imports from foreign countries.

This approach entailed an enormous expenditure of resources and the dependence on police and military forces to reduce the foreign cultivation of marijuana, coca and opium poppy and the production of cocaine and heroin. One result has been a terrible escalation in drug-related violence, corruption and gross violations of human rights in a growing number of Latin American countries.

The commission’s facts and arguments are persuasive. It recommends that governments be encouraged to experiment “with models of legal regulation of drugs … that are designed to undermine the power of organized crime and safeguard the health and security of their citizens.” For effective examples, they can look to policies that have shown promising results in Europe, Australia and other places.

But they probably won’t turn to the United States for advice. Drug policies here are more punitive and counterproductive than in other democracies, and have brought about an explosion in prison populations. At the end of 1980, just before I left office, 500,000 people were incarcerated in America; at the end of 2009 the number was nearly 2.3 million. There are 743 people in prison for every 100,000 Americans, a higher portion than in any other country and seven times as great as in Europe. Some 7.2 million people are either in prison or on probation or parole — more than 3 percent of all American adults!

Some of this increase has been caused by mandatory minimum sentencing and “three strikes you’re out” laws. But about three-quarters of new admissions to state prisons are for nonviolent crimes. And the single greatest cause of prison population growth has been the war on drugs, with the number of people incarcerated for nonviolent drug offenses increasing more than twelvefold since 1980.

Not only has this excessive punishment destroyed the lives of millions of young people and their families (disproportionately minorities), but it is wreaking havoc on state and local budgets. Former California Gov. Arnold Schwarzenegger pointed out that, in 1980, 10 percent of his state’s budget went to higher education and 3 percent to prisons; in 2010, almost 11 percent went to prisons and only 7.5 percent to higher education.

Maybe the increased tax burden on wealthy citizens necessary to pay for the war on drugs will help to bring about a reform of America’s drug policies. At least the recommendations of the Global Commission will give some cover to political leaders who wish to do what is right.

A few years ago I worked side by side for four months with a group of prison inmates, who were learning the building trade, to renovate some public buildings in my hometown of Plains, Ga. They were intelligent and dedicated young men, each preparing for a productive life after the completion of his sentence. More than half of them were in prison for drug-related crimes, and would have been better off in college or trade school.

To help such men remain valuable members of society, and to make drug policies more humane and more effective, the American government should support and enact the reforms laid out by the Global Commission on Drug Policy.

Jimmy Carter, the 39th president, is the founder of the Carter Center and the winner of the 2002 Nobel Peace Prize.
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/17/opinion/17carter.html?_r=3&hp=&pagewanted=print

NYT, June 18, 2011

Legalization Won’t Kill the Cartels

By SYLVIA LONGMIRE

St. Louis

FOR a growing number of American policy makers, politicians and activists, the best answer to the spiraling violence in Mexico is to legalize the marijuana that, they argue, fuels the country’s vicious cartels and smugglers. After all, according to official estimates, marijuana constitutes 60 percent of cartels’ drug profits. Legalization would move that trade into the open market, driving down the price and undermining the cartels’ power and influence.

Unfortunately, it’s not that easy. Marijuana legalization has many merits, but it would do little to hinder the long-term economics of the cartels — and the violent toll they take on Mexican society.

For one thing, if marijuana makes up 60 percent of the cartels’ profits, that still leaves another 40 percent, which includes the sale of methamphetamine, cocaine, and brown-powder and black-tar heroin. If marijuana were legalized, the cartels would still make huge profits from the sale of these other drugs.

Plus, there’s no reason the cartels couldn’t enter the legal market for the sale of marijuana, as organized crime groups did in the United States after the repeal of Prohibition.

Still, legalization would deliver a significant short-term hit to the cartels — if drug trafficking were the only activity they were engaged in. But cartels derive a growing slice of their income from other illegal activities. Some experts on organized crime in Latin America, like Edgardo Buscaglia, say that cartels earn just half their income from drugs.

Indeed, in recent years cartels have used an extensive portfolio of rackets and scams to diversify their income. For example, they used to kidnap rivals, informants and incompetent subordinates to punish, exact revenge or send a message. Now that they have seen that people are willing to pay heavy ransoms, kidnapping has become their second-most-lucrative venture, with the targets ranging from businessmen to migrants.

Another new source of cartel revenue is oil theft, long a problem for the Mexican government. The national oil company, Pemex, loses hundreds of millions of dollars’ worth of petroleum every year to bandits and criminal gangs who tap into pipelines and siphon it off. Now the cartels are getting involved in this business, working with associates north of the border to sell the oil to American companies at huge markups.

In 2009 a federal court convicted an American businessman of helping to funnel $2 million in petroleum products stolen from Pemex by a Mexican cartel, eventually selling it to a Texas chemical plant owned by the German chemical company BASF. The chemical company claims never to have known where the products came from.

Cartels are also moving into the market in pirated goods in Latin America. The market used to be dominated by terrorist groups like Hezbollah and Hamas, who operated in the triborder area of Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay. Now the field is being overtaken by Mexican cartels, which already have so much control over the sale of pirated CDs, DVDs and software that many legitimate companies no longer even bother to distribute their full-price products in parts of Mexico.

Taking another page from traditional organized crime, cartels are also moving into extortion. A cartel representative will approach the owner of a business — whether a pharmacy or a taco stand — demanding a monthly stipend for “protection.” If those payments aren’t made on time, the business is often burned to the ground, or the owner is threatened, kidnapped or killed.

A popular cartel racket involves branded products. For example, a cartel member — most often from Los Zetas and La Familia Michoacana, two of the largest and most diversified cartels — will tell a music-store owner that he has to sell CDs with the Zetas logo stamped on them, with the cartel taking a 25 percent cut of the profits. Noncompliance isn’t an option.

With so many lines of business, it’s unlikely that Mexican cartels would close up shop in the event of legalization, even if it meant a serious drop in profits from their most successful product. Cartels are economic entities, and like any legitimate company the best are able to adapt in the face of a changing market.

This is not to say that drug legalization shouldn’t be considered for other reasons. We need to stop viewing casual users as criminals, and we need to treat addicts as people with health and emotional problems. Doing so would free up a significant amount of jail space, court time and law enforcement resources. What it won’t do, though, is stop the violence in Mexico.

Sylvia Longmire, a former officer and investigative special agent in the Air Force, is the author of the forthcoming book “Cartel: The Coming Invasion of Mexico’s Drug Wars.”

Former CIA clandestine services officer Brian Fairchild claims that following the demise of the Soviet Union in 1991, the NCA’s (National Command Authority) interest in strategic intelligence diminished. Budgets—especially for Humint (human intelligence)– dropped sharply, and covert operations increasingly depended on receiving intel from friendly foreign services as opposed to developing our own indigenous sources. Too many in the clandestine service operated out of Headquarters at Langley—being deployed in areas of concern and grooming sources became increasingly a lost art.

Fairchild talks about “Field forward”, having assets and personnel in place overseas. “You cannot understand people, much less influence them, from Langley”, he opines. “You cannot develop deep and trusting relationships with individuals and with governments overseas by flying in and flipping out a U.S. passport”, he charges. He laments the current practice of “surging” operators to the field instead of having “an established presence”.

Washington Post op-ed writer David Ignatius adds to this theme by noting the rapid rise in the Bush 43 years of the Pentagon moving in to areas that had traditionally been the province of the CIA. US Special Forces units began operating secretly abroad, Secretary Rumsfeld created a vast intelligence empire of his own under Steven Cambone, and the Pentagon authorized having forward-deployed Special Forces units overseas.

The CIA became alarmed that is turf was being further compromised, and directed even more of its limited resources be focused on tactical, paramilitary, anti-insurgent operations. They saw their “paltry” para-military capabilities being dwarfed by the Pentagon’s armada—Delta Force, Rangers, SEALs, Marine SOF, and Army Special Forces. The result is that broad, “strategic intelligence” has been relegated to a minor place in the Intel Community’s efforts. There is concern that the appointment of GEN David Petraeus will only accelerate this shift to tactical, paramilitary ops.

I asked two of our own experts to comment on these opinions, former CIA “COO” Rae Huffstutler and former National Intelligence Officer Keith Hansen (both now in Incline), anticipating they would have some agreement and some differences. I was right.

Keith agrees with many of Fairchild’s key points, but has serious disagreements over much of the opinion piece. He believes that “Fairchild’s analysis is too narrow and lacks balance, and is too extreme and not supported by the facts.”  Keith believes that the CIA, and much of the rest of the US Intelligence Community, save military intelligence elements, continues to be focused on strategic issues that go well beyond tactical support to military operations.

The Agency did suffer from a sudden removal of its primary focus when the USSR disappeared, the primary target of its analyses and activities for decades. Further, Hansen points out, seeking the elusive “peace dividend”, the CIA suffered a severe cut in finances (as did the Pentagon). This resulted in essentially “gutting” the clandestine services. Hansen notes that the Agency had to fight hard to keep its technical resources trained on Russia, “knowing that the future of the new state was uncertain and its nuclear arsenal was still capable of destroying the U.S.”. He adds that the potential proliferation of Soviet nuclear weapons and materials was a deep concern to him.

Keith says that the CIA’s prized National Photographic Interpretation Center was transferred to Pentagon responsibility, increasing concern “that future imagery collection and analytic efforts would be focused too much on tactical military targets vice those targets that would support warning and strategic intelligence analysis”.

Hansen also observes that the reduction of funding resulted in “some tough decisions regarding which assets to keep”. The focus naturally shifted to “areas that were hot”; that is, of current interest, to the detriment of “being able to warn of tomorrow’s crises”. It also meant that the ability to “unilaterally recruit agents” and get first-hand knowledge was limited, both by exclusionary policies (e.g., Iraq) and budget cuts. The Agency found itself at a disadvantage in not having assets on the ground, but also because CIA’s personnel “were not well postured to provide the tactical, battlefield intelligence needed to support U.S. involvement in regional conflicts”.

Rae reinforces the points Keith made, noting that the tension between demands for “current” vice in-depth analyses is not a new phenomenon. After the collapse of the USSR, the Community endured a “period of drift”, in which “neither the White House nor the Congress were focused on new strategic issues, and during which neither would respond to requests for guidance on new priorities—I know, because I was the one asking”. He adds that while the clandestine services were reduced in this period, actually the cutbacks in analysis were much greater.

Huffstutler continues that many of the most advanced technical systems and techniques that were developed against the USSR at the Agency have subsequently been transferred to the Pentagon. These resources are increasingly used by the military to support current operations, leaving the CIA with some limited Humint capabilities.

Rae points out that “supporting operations in wartime” has always “commanded the largest share of our resources”. Inevitably the Agency could not provide all of the information tactical forces requested, some of which related to areas beyond the ground Commanders field of responsibility.

The Agency today also continues to look at issues of warning, arms proliferation, economic espionage, trade issues and political developments across a wide spectrum. This in addition to being very involved increasingly in paramilitary and tactical operations, sometimes working with and sometimes at odds with the Pentagon’s elements.

This is not to say that the para-military community writ large cannot combine its assets and talents to work well together. This was shown in the May 2 raid that killed OBL. Oversight came from the CIA; the Army Spec Ops aviation units flew the troops into Abbottabad; and the Navy’s SEAL 6 team provided the firepower.

Obviously we would benefit greatly from a future seminar on the “CIA Under Petraeus”, looking at the issues raised by Fairchild and Ignatius and illuminated by Rae and Keith’s observations. Perhaps the title is the “Possible Militarization of U.S. Intelligence”! Hope to do that soon, but Rae is on the East Coast right now and Keith is about to go on another mission in the Third World for his church activities. Maybe when the snow falls again and the two skiers are back in Incline for a spell we’ll do a session!

Tyrus W. Cobb

NSF Minister of Enlightenment

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Link to the Fairchild article:  http://pajamasmedia.com/blog/the-central-tactical-intelligence-agency/

Link to the Ignatius article: Click here: Rewriting Rumsfeld’s rules – The Washington Post