The two individuals who played the most prominent roles in bringing about the end of the USSR were President Ronald Reagan and Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev. The policies formulated and implemented by both had very different objectives in mind, but the end result was the same.

Beyond Détente: Promoting Fundamental Change in the Soviet System

Early in the Reagan administration a fierce fight had erupted regarding the wisdom of engaging the Soviet Union. Many conservatives were convinced that détente had shown that any attempt at negotiations or engaging Moscow was doomed to failure. They also tended to believe that the USSR was on the ascendancy, particularly in the global arena, witness the success of Moscow’s backing for “National Liberation Movements” in Africa, Southwest Asia, and Central America. They leaned toward the sense that the regime, albeit aging, was firmly in control in Moscow and that any real change seemed impossible.

I was asked in 1981 by the National Security Council, through the then Military Assistant, ADM John Poindexter, to prepare a series of point papers on the state of the USSR and what US policy initiatives might be considered. I had just completed a 2-year IREX fellowship, which brought me to the USSR off and on the past two years.

My view was: The Soviet leadership was aging, the economy was in difficult straights (my dissertation was on the Soviet economy/energy dilemma), and the U.S. could pressure the USSR to achieve political and military change. Not sure how much impact the memos had, but they fed into the cauldron of competing opinions erupting within the Administration.

President Reagan was opposed to détente, but open to negotiating with the Soviets. This would come, in his mind, only after he had reversed the American military decline, resuscitated the economy, and restored confidence within the U.S. body politic. By 1983 he felt that we should reconsider our stance of not engaging the Soviets, based on what he perceived to be further Soviet decline and U.S. restoration of power and confidence. Yes, the 1984 elections and Nancy’s prodding had a role in his thinking, but he was also buffeted in the other direction continually by the naysayers.

Reagan’s policies were laid out in 1983 in NSDD–75, titled “U.S. Relations with the USSR”. The document directed two core objectives: first, “to contain and over time reverse Soviet expansionism”, and second, “to promote the process of change in the Soviet Union toward a more pluralistic political and economic system”.

The directive also laid out specific goals: In Eastern Europe, loosening Moscow’s hold on the region; with respect to Afghanistan, it was to “keep maximum pressure on Moscow….and ensure that the Soviets’ political and military costs remained high” while the occupation continued.

NSDD-75 was a very ambitious strategic guide, one that overtly would attempt to “change” the Communist system by ending the Party’s monopoly on power and bringing about the weakening of the Soviet economy. The directive called for a more ambitious media penetration (RFE, Radio Liberty) into the USSR and its vassal states, assistance to groups in the Soviet empire who would topple the Communist regimes, and using our technological and economic leverage (e.g., to stop the Soviet gas pipeline to Europe).

Reagan and Gorbachev: One wanted to reform the Soviet system; the other to fundamentally change it

For Reagan the immediate goal was to insure that the Soviets bore the burden for actions they were taking to support anti-Western political movements, and for pouring a considerable portion of their national wealth into the defense-industrial sector. For Gorbachev, who came to power in 1985 after years of desultory “leadership” behind aging and infirm General Secretaries–Brezhnev, Andropov and Chernenko–the objective was to reform a stagnating economic system through restructuring (“perestroika”) and greater openness (“glasnost”).

We did not fully appreciate at that time that Gorbachev, unlike his predecessors, was fully aware of the depths that the Soviet economy had fallen. It also appears that Gorbachev was deeply concerned about the President’s SDI program (“Star Wars”), believing that what was at stake was more than just a space defense program. He believed that if the United States once and for all combined its technological superiority with its economic potential, America would make an enormous “skachok” (leap) ahead. The General Secretary knew that he needed to redirect resources away from the defense sector to rejuvenate the stagnating Soviet economic system, but first he must stop the U.S. potential to jump ahead—which he feared our pursuing SDI would do.

To do that he had to put a brake on Reagan’s military build-up. He also realized that deep and fundamental reforms of the corrupt, centrally managed political system needed to be undertaken. While he recognized that this would cause some disruption, he failed to anticipate that the changes he was implementing would soon spiral out of control.

Reagan was not content to allow events to proceed in the USSR on Gorbachev’s timetable. The United States took several measures to impose a burden on Moscow if it chose to continue its aggressive support of national liberation movements, its domination over East Europe, and for extensive funding of the military. Reagan directed that the U.S. support resistance movements against the Soviets in Central America and Africa, provide advanced missiles (e.g., Stingers) to the Mujahideen in Afghanistan, and support revolutionary movements in East Europe.

Specifically, working closely with Pope John Paul II (not well known even today!), the U.S. provided intelligence and economic support for the Solidarity movement in Poland that led to the first crack in the Soviet Empire. Reagan also secured support from Lane Kirkland, head of the AFL-CIO, which provided key assistance to Solidarity.

America also persuaded its friends to assist in these efforts, including encouraging Saudi Arabia to “turn on the oil spigot” and flood the world with cheap petroleum in 1986. This act severely undermined the Soviets’ primary means to secure hard currency, depleted its foreign exchange reserves, made it difficult to import badly needed grain, and deeply impacted the thinking of the Soviet leadership.

By 1986 the war in Afghanistan led to increased public discontent, the Chernobyl nuclear plant disaster seemed to personify the regime’s ossification and inability to handle crises, and the economy declined in the face of bad harvests and low global oil prices. Glasnost had led to the appearance of more popular media outlets, which then proceeded to highlight corruption in the highest echelons, rampant alcoholism, what the Stalinist regime had really done to the populace, and other formerly taboo topics.

The Empire Crubles: 1989-91

James Mann argues persuasively that Ronald Reagan defied the advice of his more hard line advisers and skillfully led the negotiations with Mikhail Gorbachev that led to the fall of the Soviet Union (“The Rebellion of Ronald Reagan”). I would agree. In fact, the President was constantly told by his chief intelligence experts, principally then Deputy Director of the CIA, Bob Gates, most Pentagon officials, and many State Department experts, that the General Secretary was not seeking fundamental change of the Soviet system and that at any rate it remained strong and impervious to outside leverage. Reagan disagreed and on many occasions overruled his advisors and directed that we engage the Soviet leadership in negotiations while continuing to exert pressure on the USSR’s economy. I believe that history has shown Reagan to be right in the course he chose.

By 1989 Moscow was faced with increasing challenges. Afghanistan was clearly a failure, and the regime agreed to withdraw Soviet forces that year. Confronted with large street demonstrations in East Europe against the puppet regimes, Gorbachev and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze refused repeated pleas from their Warsaw pact allies to intervene militarily—as they had done in Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968. As a result the Berlin Wall tumbled down, Germany was reunited, and Solidarity assumed power in Poland and Vaclev Havel’s “Velvet revolution” succeeded in Prague. And in 1991, following a failed coup attempt, the USSR itself dissolved.

In the end, the combination of greater political and social freedoms instituted by Gorbachev and the proactive policies implemented under Reagan to impose severe economic and political burdens on Moscow together led to the collapse of the Soviet Union, on Christmas Day, 1991.

-      Tyrus W. Cobb

Minister of Enlightenment

December 23, 2011

The road to Reykjavik actually began with proposals made by Reagan in 1981 to eliminate all intermediate range ballistic missiles (the so-called Zero Option) and in 1982 to reduce deployed strategic nuclear warheads by at least one-third. This was a significant departure from arms control thinking, which had previously focused only on limiting future growth of these systems.

Until Reykjavik, Soviet leaders dismissed these ideas as one sided and insincere, and rejected them. Yet Gorbachev came to Reykjavik with his own dramatic proposals, including a 50% reduction in strategic offensive arms, complete elimination of all intermediate range (INF) missiles, and a non withdrawl from the 1972 ABM treaty for 10 years.

While the Soviet leader had initially suggested only a mini summit in preparation for more detailed negotiations in 1987, the Soviets came prepared with these far-reaching and detailed proposals on arms control. President Reagan embraced the negotiations with enthusiasm, delighted to see Moscow’s willingness to consider many of our most ambitious suggestions.

The negotiations were complex, animated and highly substantive, and Gorbachev proved to be intelligent, knowledgeable and facile. Reagan held firm in his principles. No more unverifiable treaties (“Trust but Verify” he loved to say in Russian), no more agreements codifying Soviet superiority in arms on the European continent, no more tolerating Moscow’s refusal to grant its citizens basic human rights, and – perhaps most importantly to the President – no more reliance on offensive nuclear missiles to provide for our security. Gorbachev hung firm on many key points, I think hoping that the President would “understand” that an agreement on Moscow’s terms would ensure the President emerged from the Summit as a popular and respected world leader and peacemaker.

The Soviets were clearly prepared to agree to major reductions in strategic forces, intermediate range weapons, and warheads. Gorbachev even showed a willingness, however strained, to discuss our positions on regional and human rights issues. But, the one point he needed to lock in was an agreement that the U.S. would confine its research and testing on the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) to the laboratory.

We did not fully appreciate at the time that Gorbachev, unlike his predecessors, was cognizant of the depths that the Soviet economy had fallen. Most importantly, he apparently had come to the conclusion that should the United States seriously embark on its “Star Wars” plans, what was at stake was more than a space defense program. Gorbachev believed that should the USA seriously pursue SDI it represented the possibility that America would bring together its technological prowess and economic superiority in a manner that would consign the USSR, to use the Marxist term, “to the trash heap of history”.

Some have said that the reason so many Soviet concessions were made was because Reagan used SDI as a “bargaining chip”. Maybe so. However, the reason SDI succeeded so well was precisely because the President believed in the program so passionately. It was a great bargaining tool because the President did not believe it was a “bargaining chip”.

The final session that stretched into the night was a scene of high drama. Gorbachev offered to eliminate all strategic forces, not just ballistic missiles. Reagan then countered that it would be fine with him if they could agree to eliminate all nuclear weapons. They almost had an agreement. The sticking point fell to the area that most concerned the Soviets – confining Reagan’s SDI to the laboratory.

This the President could not agree to. As the two leaders walked to the door with dour looks on their faces, Gorbachev asked the President, “What more could we have done?” Reagan, asking Gorbachev how he could “turn down a historic opportunity because of a single word”, simply said to the General Secretary, “You could have said yes.”

Despite the apparent failure at Reykjavik the two parties resumed negotiations and the following year signed the INF treaty at the Washington Summit, totally eliminating the intermediate range missiles. By 1991 the two sides agreed on a START treaty that cut the US and Soviet nuclear arsenals by 80% over the next decade.

Mikhail Gorbachev wrote this week that while the Reykjavik Summit failed to “achieve our highest aspirations”, the Summit served as “the major turning point in the quest for a safer and secure world.”  Years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Gorbachev was asked what precipitated the USSR’s demise. Without hesitation, he answered, “Oh, its Reykjavik.”

Tyrus W. Cobb served as Executive Secretary for President Reagan’s Summits in Geneva in 1985 and Reykjavik in 1986.

/////////////

Aside from the huge policy implications of the Reykjavik Summit, let me share a few anecdotes and side notes:

I served as the Executive Secretary for the Geneva and Reykjavik Summits, which essentially meant I was in charge of coordinating the briefing sessions and preparatory papers. Nothing glamorous. However, having found out about the proposed Summit that would occur in Iceland in less than two weeks, I immediately requested that we have the President’s full attention for a series of briefings on key issues. Well, that led to a tumultuous intra-White House fight, as the Political Directorate was more concerned with having the popular President on the campaign trail since the 1986 mid-term elections were coming up. In one of the exchanges I said to the political team that there was no way we could permit the President to be out on the campaign trail now. One responded to me that on the schedule were “two stops in Nevada, on behalf of your buddy, Jim Santini”, running for the Senate. “Oh”, I said, “Guess that would be ok!”

When I went home I told my wife Suellen that we would be heading for Reykjavik for a “mini-Summit” in 10 days, but were not going to have but a few prep sessions with the President. “Mini-Summit?” she responded with a doubtful look. “Gorby got his clocked cleaned in Geneva”, she said, “Do you really think he is just coming for a handshake?”

Hmmm. She was right. When the Soviet delegation arrived it was clear that they had a full team that was thoroughly ready to pursue a very ambitious agenda. And, by the way, contrary to the agreements that no wives would join the leaders, Raisa Gorbacheva stepped off the plane. Bad sign. Nancy did not come to the Summit and President Reagan did not function as well without her. As the Summit became more substantive and contentious, we could tell that Reagan really missed having Nancy there with him.

The Icelanders were kind to provide a small venue for the talks—the supposedly haunted Hofdi House—but it was really tiny. As the talks proceeded and became more detailed, Soviet and American negotiators found themselves huddled almost together in the cramped quarters’ basement, all sharing only one bathroom!

The American team imposed a blackout on contacting “higher HQ” during the talks. This put BG John Moellering, who was the JCS representative there, in a most difficult spot. He was a relative neophyte to the arms control arena and had been in that postion only a few days, but he was astute enough to recognize that major decisions were being reached without the advice and comments of the Joint Chiefs. At one crucial point, weighing the potential wrath of violating the secrecy ban against the obvious need to keep his superiors informed, he asked me what I thought he should do…..What would you have advised him? I think John retired as a one-star! The Chiefs were NOT happy campers.

When we came back from Reykjavik, our European allies were up in arms—what were we thinking trading away their security—the GLCM and Pershing missiles especially—without consultations! Alas, weren’t these the same Europeans who had been beating us down for years with birch rods for our inflexibility on arms control issues? Mitterrand and Kohl, especially, but yes, Maggie, too. Loved it.

A final point—until Reykjavik many outside observers were unaware of President Reagan’s strong opposition to nuclear weapons and his desire to rid the earth of these horribly destructive weapons. Now they knew it, but those around the President had often heard him just ask, “Well, Cap…or Bud…or George…why can’t we just agree to abolish ALL nuclear weapons”. All of his advisors—and that included George Shultz at the time, despite his more recent declarations in favor of a nuclear-free world—would recoil and say something like, “Well, Mr. President, we agree in principle, but given Soviet conventional force advantages, we cannot at this time consider giving up our reliability on nuclear weapons to repel Soviet aggression”. The President would nod, “Well, ok, I won’t push it”. But you knew he would and he certainly did at Reykjavik!

Tyrus W. Cobb

Minister of Enlightenment, the NSF

The Nevada Appeal, Aug 18, 2011

Construction on the Berlin Wall began 50 years ago this week, a monument to the cruelty toward their own populations by the Communist governments of East Germany and the USSR. The Wall finally came down 22 years ago, ending a division of the German people that brought horror, family separation and political confrontations for a quarter century. I have two vivid memories of that Wall—one depressing—the murder of Peter Fechter; the other uplifting, Reagan’s 1987 speech demanding that Mr. Gorbachev “Tear Down This Wall”.

First, back to August, 1962, when two college and fraternity classmates—Joe Eberle and Jon Madsen—and I were in Europe for a vagabond trip post-college. On August 21, we had gotten to Berlin and drove into the Eastern sector, through Checkpoint Charlie. After driving through East Berlin for a few hours, we headed back toward the Checkpoint, when we heard gunfire about 100 yards away Three East German young men had made a dash for freedom, attempting to jump over the Wall. One was killed instantly, another got over the Wall to safety. A third, Peter Fechter, was shot and lay bleeding to death on the East German side. He cried for help, but no one—West German police, American soldiers, or us–ran to assist him. Indeed, we were told not to try since he was on the other side of the barrier, and anyone attempting to help him would likely be shot by the Vopos.

Photo—Peter Fechter dying by the Wall)

That moment haunted me to this day, and probably helped form many of my strong anti-communist views. And, while Fechter died after bleeding to death for an hour, his memory is permanently enshrined in the West as a symbol of defiance and the quest for freedom.

Second, another remembrance.  It was the spring of 1987 and at the White House we were enmeshed in planning for President Reagan’s June trip to Europe. The centerpiece of that swing was theEconomic Summit to be held in Venice (where Suellen and I were married), a State visit to Italy, and an important meeting with Pope John Paul at the Vatican. The Economic Summit, the Italian visit (hampered by yet another collapse of the Italian government!), and the Papal meeting occupied most of my time. Somewhere along the way, responding to an appeal from Chancellor Helmut Kohl to come to Berlin to celebrate the city’s 750th anniversary, a brief 3-hour visit to Berlin was tacked on.

The President was to make a speech, and the advance team persuaded their very worried German counterparts to allow Reagan to make his address in front of the Brandenburg Gate. Quite a setting and one that demanded at least one or two memorable lines. The American speechwriter, Peter Robinson, aided by senior White House staff, fixated on recommending that the President call for Gorbachev (and not the East German leadership) to “Tear down this wall”. As with any speech, internal feuding broke out between the politically oriented speechwriters and the more cautious State department and NSC staff—who were worried that what progress that had been achieved in East-West relations, with General Secretary Gorbachev personally, and between the two German governments, would go down the drain if the President were to utter some impolitic phrase.

(Photo—President Reagan at the Brandenburg Gate—1987)

The dispute over the key “four words” carried on until the final minutes, with State and NSC pleading to take the phrase out. Several times leading up to the trip, and on the day of the speech, the President was asked to reconsider the wisdom of making that demand. Each time he nodded, turned his head, thought for a moment, then said, “Keep it in”.

Two years later the Wall indeed did come down. Shortly thereafter the two Germanys were reunited, and the new German nation joined the NATO Alliance. Thanks to Reagan for uttering the words that sped that dramatic change. And let us not forget those like Peter Fechter who lost their lives trying to escape to freedom.

• Tyrus W. Cobb

(photos added)

WAS THE DROPPING OF THE ATOMIC BOMBS JUSTIFIED?

The period between August 6 and August 9 always calls for revaluations of President Truman’s decision to drop the Atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. That took on an added dimension this year when the Obama Administration dispatched our Ambassador to Japan, John Roos, to attend the ceremonies in Hiroshima for the first time.

Does this constitute an apology of sorts? Well, officials are quick to say, “No”, but it is probably being interpreted as a prelude to such. This dispatch of the Ambassador, coupled with Obama’s “body language” (bowing) during his visit to Japan, might encourage the Japanese to expect a more formal apology. After all, some will argue, wasn’t the dropping of the bombs themselves an immoral act that would justify an apology?

I think not. While there have been no shortage of “revisionist historians” who have argued that using atomic weapons against Japan, especially “civilian targets”, was not necessary and had a racist impetus (W.A. Williams, Howard Zinn), I remain unconvinced. In fact, I still hold to the view that dropping the bombs saved lives (Japanese as well as American), shortened the war, brought a more successful outcome than any other option, and was more moral than the alternatives.

First, before the United States considers any kind of apology, I think it necessary for Japan to apologize to us, and to China, and to many other Asian nations trampled by its imperialistic march. After all, it was Japan that launched the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor, and Japan that conducted such atrocities as the Bataan death march, the rape of Nanking, and the pillaging of SE Asia. Some have put the total Asian deaths due to the Japanese occupation and war machine at more than 17 million!

We should remember that even with the dropping of the A-bombs and the Emperor’s decision to surrender unconditionally, there was considerable, deep opposition to doing so, and it took several days for the country’s elite to finally acquiesce. This gives sufficient support to the estimates prepared by Washington that an invasion of the islands would cost the U.S. and its allies a million casualties! We know that the Japanese military, and most citizens, were prepared to defend the homeland to the death.

Also, we should not forget that we had already inflicted severe damage on Japan by other means, including incinerating more than 100,000 citizens by napalm, leaving another 500,000 homeless (in comparison, the atomic bombs probably caused the deaths, ultimately, of 200,000). Between March and August of 1945, air raids (including firebombing) continued to wreak havoc. Indeed, the initial firebombing of Tokyo in March was more lethal than either Hiroshima or Nagasaki! Would continued aerial devastation by these and other non-nuclear means been any more humane?

And Hiroshima and Nagasaki (actually not the primary target that day, but cloud cover prevented hitting the designated city) were major centers of war production and the site of key military facilities.

If we chose instead to blockade Japan, we likely could have starved the country. That would have led to hundreds of thousands of Japanese deaths.

It is doubtful that the U.S. could have continued to conduct a war with seemingly unattainable objectives. With the end of WWII in Europe in May, the country was war weary, broke, out of talent to enlist in the ranks, and headed by a weak, inexperienced President. Consider this—if President Truman decided against employing atomic bombs when they became available, and instead opted for a blockade, an invasion or a prolonged standoff, I believe he would have been summarily impeached.

No, that was not a good idea to send AMB Roos to the Hiroshima commemoration, and it is not time for the U.S. to consider issuing an apology for dropping the atomic bombs. It is, however, high time for Tokyo to finally do so.

•  Tyrus W. Cobb

August 8, 2010

President Obama’s personal intervention at the 11th hour, particularly in forcing very disappointed “developing” nations to accept a modest accord, led to a climate deal that provides for “monitoring” emission cuts by each country, but set no targets for cutting greenhouse gases—and no deadline for reaching a comprehensive international climate treaty.

The inability to negotiate a legally binding treaty in Copenhagen was a disappointment to Obama, who dearly wanted a global agreement that would commit the 143 participating nations to reducing greenhouse emissions in half by 2050. However, the developing countries, led by China and India, were reluctant to sign on themselves to this goal, given the impact such restrictions would have on their rapidly expanding economies.

For the “developing” nations–who believe (correctly) that the U.S. and Europe built their prosperity on the utilization of fossil fuels, particularly coal and wood, and who now contribute most of the carbon emissions into the atmosphere–it was important that the “rich countries” commit to drastically reduce their emissions. They also, understandably, wanted to be free to pursue a similar course of development and not themselves be constrained by such targets—until, at least, they reached a level of greenhouse gas output similar to the developed world.

The wide gulf between American and Chinese goals and demands almost led to a total breakdown of the conference at many points. In the end, Chinese opposition to intrusive monitoring and verification carried the day, and the Summit produced only a promise by all nations “to list their existing pledges” and “provide information on their progress”. Not much of an agreement.

For the President, that is not a bad outcome. He can be viewed by the environmental community of having made bold gestures to commit the United States to serious emissions cuts by 2050, and for intervening forcefully with the recalcitrant Chinese. While I don’t doubt Obama’s personal commitment to climate change, I suspect many officials within his Administration are breathing a sigh of relief that the U.S.will not have to sacrifice economic growth to offset increasingly controversial goals to combat global warming.

In the first part of this decade the adherents of climate change, and of the severe impacts global warming would have, pretty well carried the day. Recently, however, the “doubters” on climate change have secured the initiative, to the point that the science underlying warming has been, while not discredited, subject to a lack of intellectual certitude.

The “realists” were handed an unbelievable boost recently when the lead academic center on global warming, the UK University of East Anglia, posted emails to fellow climate change adherents that seemingly acknowledged some uncomfortable facts. First, that in the past decade (unlike the 1990’s), the earth seemed to be experiencing a period of cooling—not warming. Secondly, when the data seemed to call basic assumptions into question, the East Anglicans actually suggested ignoring or altering that data. One email noted that “The fact is that we can’t account for the lack of global warming at the movement….and it is a travesty that we can’t”.

As many of you know I am somewhere in the middle of all this. First, I do subscribe to the basic tenets of the climate change adherents, led by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPPC). I think the science leads to the conclusion that global warming is occurring and that much of that is due to man-made contributions—principally emissions of carbon dioxide.

At the same time I follow the conclusions of the Danish environmentalist, Bjorn Lomborg, who argues that rather than mandating economic growth killing carbon taxes and other measures, that we try to mitigate the worst aspects of warming and learn to adjust to the rest. I keep in mind that a member of the IPPC itself concedes that the CO2 tax required to bring emissions down to the levels demanded by the IPCC would reduce global GNP by $40 trillion!

Cheap, carbon-based energy has been the foundation of our economic growth and reversing that process quickly would have a serious deleterious impact on our economies. Given that there is lingering doubt as to whether changes occurring in the climate are from natural origins or man-caused, and that the supposition that if we do nothing catastrophic change will ensue is also unproven, let’s be modest in what we commit to do.

I was reviewing several articles and analyses on Copenhagen and climate change in general. I commend to you a piece in the Washington Post on December 9 by—don’t laugh—GOV Sarah Palin! She points out that “good environmental policy-making is about weighing real-world costs and benefits—not pursuing a political agenda”. She says that this is not to deny the reality of some changes in climate—“far from it”, she writes, citing coastal erosion, thawing permafrost, and retreating sea ice that she dealt with in Alaska. She concludes that “while we recognize the occurrence of these natural, cyclical environmental trends, we can’t say with assurance that man’s activities cause weather change.”

Well, I think we can, but her final point is one to consider: she argues that “We can say, however, that any potential benefits of proposed emissions reduction policies are far outweighed by their economic costs”. Thus we must be assured that any cap and tax/trade scheme does not result in severe job losses, much higher energy costs, and economic collapse. That is close to the arguments Longborg makes.

In sum, before we embark on any massive program to cut emissions, let’s be certain that:

(1) There is significant and verifiable climate change occurring;

(2) The primary cause of the global warming is our carbon-based emissions;

(3) Steps taken to decrease emissions do not result in economic growth prevention;

(4) The U.S. expands the production of electrical energy generated by (environmentally friendly) nuclear power plants;

(5) Efforts continue to develop real “clean-coal” technologies (while “clean coal” may not be feasible, since we have 250 years of coal in reserve, let’s do what we can to mitigate the harmful impact of coal plants);

(6) We subsidize the shift to geothermal, wind and solar, but keep in mind that these sources are unlikely in the near term to produce power economically or reliably.

Thanks! Ty

Tyrus W. Cobb
December 20, 2009

Click here for the entire Sarah Palin piece in the Post

Click here: Sarah Palin – Sarah Palin on the politicization of the Copenhagen climate conference