Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta confided to reporters while on the way to a NATO conference that the U.S. would end its combat role in Afghanistan a year earlier than expected, and will soon begin to shift responsibility increasingly to CIA and DOD Special Operations Forces rather than large, conventional ground forces. The announcement surprised—and alarmed—the Afghan government and key American allies. The White House has spent a lot of energy trying to walk this comment back, and have expressed irritation that this major revision of policy should have emanated from the White House.

The plan would represent a major shift in operational strategy, resulting in the removal of the 32,000 “surge” forces sent in to reinforce our struggling counter-insurgency/nation-building (COIN) effort. The new focus will rely more on SOF/paramilitary units to counter residual terrorist threats, elite commando teams that will target insurgent commanders and terrorist leaders. U.S. forces will continue to train Afghan military and police units, on whom more of the day by day burden of fighting the war will fall.

The Washington Post reports that Panetta’s remarks also “poured fuel” on an ongoing debate within the administration over the right mix of negotiating with the Taliban and killing them. Some officials feel that the revelation weakens the NATO/US hand before more talks with Taliban representatives in Qatar later this month.

The United States now has about 90,000 troops in Afghanistan, with about 22,000 slated to come home by fall. Previously the administration had said that 2014 would see the end of U.S. combat operations, and now that timetable appears to have been moved up at least a year.

The revised strategy would appear to represent a reversal of President Obama’s description of the Afghan conflict as the war that needed to be fought (as opposed to Iraq) and the surge of troop strength he committed just last year to the war. Political and military realities have now superseded any previous assessments, as the American public wearies of the war in an election year and the Afghan partnership is fraying. Civilian and military leaders alike are disappointed by the continued incompetence and corruption of the Karzai government, the abysmal performance by police units, and the tenacity of the Taliban and other insurgent groups.

While the war has always been unpopular with Obama’s base, the conflict is enduring a lessening of support from Republicans and Independents as well. All are tiring of the seemingly endless conflict and the difficulties in changing the Afghan culture. More are gravitating to the approach advocated earlier by Vice-President Joe Biden which would rely more on Special Operations forces, raids, drone attacks, and “targeted assassinations” of key Taliban leaders.

The Panetta “announcement” also comes alongside the unauthorized leak of a NATO study that predicts a Taliban takeover of Afghanistan following the departure of ISAF forces (US/Europe). The estimate provides further fuel to stoke the disgruntlement of the American populace with the costs of the war, both in terms of lives and money, and the seemingly improbable quest for a successful outcome. Panetta’s statement will be greeted with shock, initially, on the part of our Allies, but most will be only too glad to see an earlier departure timetable.

Most likely the new approach will be resisted by the military commanders on the ground, who feel they are making progress and need more time, more money, and more troops. That’s not likely to happen, making General John Allen’s task as the ISAF commanding general much more challenging than it is even today.

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Speaking of Secretary Panetta’s bluntness, two other recent comments by the SecDef have also generated surprise and some shock. First it was the revelation that a Pakistani doctor (name provided!) was instrumental in assisting the U.S. in ascertaining Osama bin Laden’s residence and his location. This was done before the doctor could be spirited out of the country and it is far from clear why Panetta revealed this doctor’s role.

Panetta also hinted strongly that there is a strong likelihood that Israel would strike Iran as early as April, a highly unusual muse by a Defense Secretary. I’m personally not sure if this isn’t just part of a coherent “public diplomacy” (disinformation) campaign being conducted by the West to convince the Iranian leadership that an Israeli attack is imminent and they’d better become more accommodating with respect to their nuclear program. Whichever, we are witnessing a flurry of “insider leaks” from Israel and the U.S. that seem to indicate that the possibility of an Israeli strike on Iran is becoming more likely. Certainly the comments from Tel Aviv are also pointed in that direction.

Meanwhile, In Tehran, the supreme leader, Ali Khamenei, in a defiant address, said that nothing would impede his regime from its objective of acquiring nuclear weapons. “Sanctions will not have any impact on our determination to pursue our nuclear course”, he proclaimed. Khamenei seemed buoyed by the possibility of an Israeli strike, in fact, and almost welcomes it.

What worries me is that he just might. With the Iranian economy in a tailspin, the populace increasingly disgruntled with the religious and civilian leadership, and social media stirring up the youth, the mullahs and the military may feel that the only thing that could salvage their position and unite the Iranian people would be an attack by Israel and, by implication, the U.S.

And, here in the U.S., as the 2012 presidential election moves closer, the question of which candidate is closer to Israel will be a key campaign debating point. That means that the impetus for the administration and the GOP candidate to appear fully supportive of Israel at this crucial juncture will drive positions further toward backing whatever Tel Aviv decides to do. I suspect the Israeli leadership knows that full well, and that factor may also enter into their own calculations on the timetable and advisability of a strike this year.

Keep watching—this will only get more interesting!

• Tyrus W. Cobb,

Former Special Assistant to President Reagan

February 5, 2012

Has the Central Intelligence Agency become the

Tactical Intelligence Agency?”

 With

 Rae Huffstutler

Former Executive Director, the CIA

 And other Intel community veterans

The Ramada Inn, Thursday, February 9, 9:00 am

Increasing attention has been directed at a covert intelligence war and paramilitary activities that have become a key part of American national security strategy. To a great extent implementation of this approach relies heavily on U.S. military Special Operations Forces and the paramilitary arm of the Central Intelligence Agency. The new warfare the CIA is engaged in is heavily dependent on the use of unmanned armed aircrafts (drones) and covert operations in key areas of concern – Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia, and elsewhere. This has led some observers to assert that the CIA has relegated its decades long principle focus on strategic analysis to a secondary position as it becomes, in essence, “The Tactical Intelligence Agency”.

We are fortunate to have Rae Huffstutler with us for this discussion. A graduate of U.C. Berkley with a degree in Economics, he joined the CIA in 1958 and spent much of his career analyzing the USSR. He headed up the Soviet division and was the Director of the National Photographic Interpretation Center (NPIC). Huffstutler’s last assignment was as the Executive Director (COO) of the CIA. In those roles he guided the Agency’s evolution in technical collection and analysis and the rise of the CIA as the preeminent analytical and estimate agency (diminishing the role of the military services).

 We will use a different format for this session – more a “Meet the Press” style interview. We will want to ask Rae about the role of the CIA in developing Soviet estimates, the increasing importance of overhead photography, the tension between policy makers and analysts, and specific activities. This will include addressing the charge that the Agency now and in the past has been engaged in “targeted assassinations”, previously by such means as phony cigars but today through the employment of UAVs, Special Forces, and “cyber intrusion”.

  We will also get comments from some veterans of the Intelligence community who are part of our NSF. Please join us for what will most certainly be an informative and provocative discussion.

 Please RSVP (ACCEPTANCES ONLY)by clicking this link or by calling 746-3222. A complete breakfast will be served. There will be a $15 dollar charge at the door for the presentation and breakfast. We recommend arriving by 8:30 to enjoy some pre-presentation food and conversation.

]]> http://nationalsecurityforum.net/meetings/nsf-meeting-february-9th-militarization-of-the-cia/feed/ 0 http://nationalsecurityforum.net/domestic-news/homeland-security/the-defense-strategic-guidance-what%e2%80%99s-new-what-is-the-focus-is-it-realistic/ http://nationalsecurityforum.net/domestic-news/homeland-security/the-defense-strategic-guidance-what%e2%80%99s-new-what-is-the-focus-is-it-realistic/#comments Sun, 08 Jan 2012 18:51:12 +0000 Maria http://nationalsecurityforum.net/?p=738 Continue reading →]]> President Obama went to the Pentagon to announce the Defense Department’s new “Strategic Guidance”, the document that will serve as the template for weapons acquisition, force sizing, military strategy, budgeting, and geographic focus for the future. It is highly unusual for the President to personally announce the new guidance, but it was clear that Obama wants everyone to understand that, however controversial (and it is), this is the document that will drive force reductions, mission realignments and procurement for the next decade.

The new Defense Guidance is being driven first and foremost by the fiscal crisis. The 2011 budget agreement requires the Pentagon to reduce spending by $487 billion, with $263 billion of that over the next five years! And that’s only if “sequestration” isn’t implemented in FY 2013, a move that would require another $600 billion in cuts!

Geographic and mission shifts

The Guidance shifts the focus of military planning to the Asia-Pacific area, calls for deep reductions of Army and Marine ground forces in favor of air and naval forces, abandons the “2-war” capability concept, and says good-bye to nation building and counter-insurgency operations.

Specifically, the Army will be reduced to 490,000 troops from 570,000 and the Marines to 175,000 from 202,000. The President and Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta justified the downsizing by emphasizing that the U.S. is now “looking beyond the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan”, and is unlikely to be engaged again in long-term nation building with substantial ground force commitments. The document directly states that “U.S. forces will no longer be sized to conduct large-scale, prolonged stability operations”.  The Pentagon leadership hastened to add that we would retain the “know how” to conduct COIN operations if necessary and the ability to “regenerate” appropriate force levels if required. That might be very hard to achieve.

Panetta said the U.S. will increase its power projection capabilities, “focus on enhanced presence”, capitalize on our “technological edge”, maintain a force that is flexible, adaptable and nimble, and, above all, be cost effective. Hmm?  Does this sound like Don Rumsfeld 10 years ago?

Geographically, the shift of emphasis to the “Asia-Pacific” theater portends a major rethinking of our base and force presence in Europe. Look for a major drawdown of our presence there and a demand that our allies take on more of the regional commitments as well as assisting in our global responsibilities. This all makes strategic sense given the low threat level presently in the European theater.

The enhanced presence will mainly be in the waters south of east Asia, but not with respect to Korea, ironically considering the turmoil in Pyongyang following the death of Kim Jong Il. Nor does it say anything about Japan. The focus is on China and the oceans and seas nearby.

The Guidance is quite clear with respect to the abandonment of any pretense of maintaining the ability to fight two major contingencies simultaneously. In reality we lost that option years ago, if we ever really had it, but this is the first time that it has been acknowledged. We now will have the ability to fight one major war, while handling other minor contingencies. Realistic.

What is driving the new focus of the Guidance clearly are concerns over the growing military might of China and what is seen as the PRC’s expansionist goals in the South China Sea and beyond. Thus in place of the “Air-Land Battle” doctrine of the Cold War era, the Defense Guidance emphasizes the priority that the “Air-Sea Battle” doctrine now has.

What are the weapon choices for implementing this guidance?

The President stated that “We will continue to get rid of outdated Cold-war systems, so that we can invest in the systems for the future”. What might these weapons be? Probably nuclear weapons for starters, although they are relatively inexpensive. Secretary Gates already cut the buy on the F-22, thinking that there is no country that could significantly challenge our air superiority. The F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, hobbled by cost overruns and serious technical issues, might be a candidate for reduced purchases. Ironically, given the stress on power projection, the Pentagon also plans to reduce our aircraft carriers from 11-10 (probably reflecting valid conclusions that the Chinese will soon have missile capabilities to take out carriers and surface ships rather quickly).

Cyber warfare is highlighted often in the Guidance, so expect significant increases in denial capability as well as offensive cyber intrusion capabilities. Look for an expansion of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) like the Predator drones, which have become a mainstay of our counter-terrorism operations and will be more fully integrated into war planning for major contingencies.

Any capability that enhances the work of Special Operations forces will be given a high priority since CIA-JSOC forces and requirements will receive more attention. In countering threats in places like Yemen, Somalia, or even Pakistan, the direction will favor the employment of aerial drones and Special Operations forces. They are cheaper and less politically intrusive.

The Defense Guidance comes under quick and heavy criticism

Critics were quick to dump on the new Guidance. Some feel the focus on a singular threat (China) in place of “strategic pluralism” fails to anticipate where threats may arise. They note that we have been very weak in forecasting where U.S. forces might need to be committed over the past 20 years, and the Guidance foregoes flexibility on that front. They also point out the maintaining “multiple capabilities” complicates a potential enemy’s planning.

Nearly everyone adversely impacted by this shift has raised alarm bells, including organizations that protect military retiree and health benefits, which will certainly be reduced! Army and Marine related groups are understandably apoplectic, as are major defense firms producing weapons for the current environment or for the “Fight two major wars simultaneously” contingencies. Not too many main battle tanks to be coming off the assembly lines in the future.

In sum however, these critics fail to take under consideration the fiscal crisis the country faces. Reductions across the board are coming down the line and the Pentagon cannot be exempted. Indeed, as the President pointed out, we will continue to spend more on defense than the next 10 countries combined! And with a public mood decisively shifting away from “foreign entanglements”, the Defense Guidance does reflect political as well as economic realities.

Do you agree? For your information the Defense Guidance is attached. Take a shot at rewriting it!

Tyrus W. Cobb

Former Special Assistant to the President

For National Security Affairs

Click here: http://www.defense.gov/news/Defense_Strategic_Guidance.pdf

The two individuals who played the most prominent roles in bringing about the end of the USSR were President Ronald Reagan and Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev. The policies formulated and implemented by both had very different objectives in mind, but the end result was the same.

Beyond Détente: Promoting Fundamental Change in the Soviet System

Early in the Reagan administration a fierce fight had erupted regarding the wisdom of engaging the Soviet Union. Many conservatives were convinced that détente had shown that any attempt at negotiations or engaging Moscow was doomed to failure. They also tended to believe that the USSR was on the ascendancy, particularly in the global arena, witness the success of Moscow’s backing for “National Liberation Movements” in Africa, Southwest Asia, and Central America. They leaned toward the sense that the regime, albeit aging, was firmly in control in Moscow and that any real change seemed impossible.

I was asked in 1981 by the National Security Council, through the then Military Assistant, ADM John Poindexter, to prepare a series of point papers on the state of the USSR and what US policy initiatives might be considered. I had just completed a 2-year IREX fellowship, which brought me to the USSR off and on the past two years.

My view was: The Soviet leadership was aging, the economy was in difficult straights (my dissertation was on the Soviet economy/energy dilemma), and the U.S. could pressure the USSR to achieve political and military change. Not sure how much impact the memos had, but they fed into the cauldron of competing opinions erupting within the Administration.

President Reagan was opposed to détente, but open to negotiating with the Soviets. This would come, in his mind, only after he had reversed the American military decline, resuscitated the economy, and restored confidence within the U.S. body politic. By 1983 he felt that we should reconsider our stance of not engaging the Soviets, based on what he perceived to be further Soviet decline and U.S. restoration of power and confidence. Yes, the 1984 elections and Nancy’s prodding had a role in his thinking, but he was also buffeted in the other direction continually by the naysayers.

Reagan’s policies were laid out in 1983 in NSDD–75, titled “U.S. Relations with the USSR”. The document directed two core objectives: first, “to contain and over time reverse Soviet expansionism”, and second, “to promote the process of change in the Soviet Union toward a more pluralistic political and economic system”.

The directive also laid out specific goals: In Eastern Europe, loosening Moscow’s hold on the region; with respect to Afghanistan, it was to “keep maximum pressure on Moscow….and ensure that the Soviets’ political and military costs remained high” while the occupation continued.

NSDD-75 was a very ambitious strategic guide, one that overtly would attempt to “change” the Communist system by ending the Party’s monopoly on power and bringing about the weakening of the Soviet economy. The directive called for a more ambitious media penetration (RFE, Radio Liberty) into the USSR and its vassal states, assistance to groups in the Soviet empire who would topple the Communist regimes, and using our technological and economic leverage (e.g., to stop the Soviet gas pipeline to Europe).

Reagan and Gorbachev: One wanted to reform the Soviet system; the other to fundamentally change it

For Reagan the immediate goal was to insure that the Soviets bore the burden for actions they were taking to support anti-Western political movements, and for pouring a considerable portion of their national wealth into the defense-industrial sector. For Gorbachev, who came to power in 1985 after years of desultory “leadership” behind aging and infirm General Secretaries–Brezhnev, Andropov and Chernenko–the objective was to reform a stagnating economic system through restructuring (“perestroika”) and greater openness (“glasnost”).

We did not fully appreciate at that time that Gorbachev, unlike his predecessors, was fully aware of the depths that the Soviet economy had fallen. It also appears that Gorbachev was deeply concerned about the President’s SDI program (“Star Wars”), believing that what was at stake was more than just a space defense program. He believed that if the United States once and for all combined its technological superiority with its economic potential, America would make an enormous “skachok” (leap) ahead. The General Secretary knew that he needed to redirect resources away from the defense sector to rejuvenate the stagnating Soviet economic system, but first he must stop the U.S. potential to jump ahead—which he feared our pursuing SDI would do.

To do that he had to put a brake on Reagan’s military build-up. He also realized that deep and fundamental reforms of the corrupt, centrally managed political system needed to be undertaken. While he recognized that this would cause some disruption, he failed to anticipate that the changes he was implementing would soon spiral out of control.

Reagan was not content to allow events to proceed in the USSR on Gorbachev’s timetable. The United States took several measures to impose a burden on Moscow if it chose to continue its aggressive support of national liberation movements, its domination over East Europe, and for extensive funding of the military. Reagan directed that the U.S. support resistance movements against the Soviets in Central America and Africa, provide advanced missiles (e.g., Stingers) to the Mujahideen in Afghanistan, and support revolutionary movements in East Europe.

Specifically, working closely with Pope John Paul II (not well known even today!), the U.S. provided intelligence and economic support for the Solidarity movement in Poland that led to the first crack in the Soviet Empire. Reagan also secured support from Lane Kirkland, head of the AFL-CIO, which provided key assistance to Solidarity.

America also persuaded its friends to assist in these efforts, including encouraging Saudi Arabia to “turn on the oil spigot” and flood the world with cheap petroleum in 1986. This act severely undermined the Soviets’ primary means to secure hard currency, depleted its foreign exchange reserves, made it difficult to import badly needed grain, and deeply impacted the thinking of the Soviet leadership.

By 1986 the war in Afghanistan led to increased public discontent, the Chernobyl nuclear plant disaster seemed to personify the regime’s ossification and inability to handle crises, and the economy declined in the face of bad harvests and low global oil prices. Glasnost had led to the appearance of more popular media outlets, which then proceeded to highlight corruption in the highest echelons, rampant alcoholism, what the Stalinist regime had really done to the populace, and other formerly taboo topics.

The Empire Crubles: 1989-91

James Mann argues persuasively that Ronald Reagan defied the advice of his more hard line advisers and skillfully led the negotiations with Mikhail Gorbachev that led to the fall of the Soviet Union (“The Rebellion of Ronald Reagan”). I would agree. In fact, the President was constantly told by his chief intelligence experts, principally then Deputy Director of the CIA, Bob Gates, most Pentagon officials, and many State Department experts, that the General Secretary was not seeking fundamental change of the Soviet system and that at any rate it remained strong and impervious to outside leverage. Reagan disagreed and on many occasions overruled his advisors and directed that we engage the Soviet leadership in negotiations while continuing to exert pressure on the USSR’s economy. I believe that history has shown Reagan to be right in the course he chose.

By 1989 Moscow was faced with increasing challenges. Afghanistan was clearly a failure, and the regime agreed to withdraw Soviet forces that year. Confronted with large street demonstrations in East Europe against the puppet regimes, Gorbachev and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze refused repeated pleas from their Warsaw pact allies to intervene militarily—as they had done in Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968. As a result the Berlin Wall tumbled down, Germany was reunited, and Solidarity assumed power in Poland and Vaclev Havel’s “Velvet revolution” succeeded in Prague. And in 1991, following a failed coup attempt, the USSR itself dissolved.

In the end, the combination of greater political and social freedoms instituted by Gorbachev and the proactive policies implemented under Reagan to impose severe economic and political burdens on Moscow together led to the collapse of the Soviet Union, on Christmas Day, 1991.

-      Tyrus W. Cobb

Minister of Enlightenment

December 23, 2011

High level defense sources confirm that the drone the Iranians have displayed on TV is, in fact, an intact RQ-170 Sentinel. The capture—however it was done—is a severe blow to America’s super-secret surveillance program, leaving advanced, highly sensitive technology in the hands of an arch-enemy.

The sources also confirm that the beige-colored drone is a CIA adaptation of the craft. It is programmed to automatically return to its base of operation should it lose communication with its control central. No one is sure why it apparently “landed itself” safely in Iran, over which it was probably conducting surveillance. The Iranians claim they penetrated the drone’s internal communications and brought it down. This is highly doubtful, even should the Iranians have had Chinese or Russian “assistance”, which is also unlikely.

Why the Sentinel did not have a self-destruct mechanism is not known. It may have and the drone simply “thought” it was returning to its base of operations. Whatever, the Iranians have a golden opportunity to sell the drone intact or in pieces to certain adversaries. U.S. officials are concerned that others may be able to reverse engineer the chemical composition of the drone’s radar-detecting paint or the craft’s sophisticated optics technology that enables operators to make positive identifications of terror suspects from tens of thousands of feet high. The sensors would be very important for countries like China to exploit.

In Russia, voters, despite a fraudulent election, hand Putin a major defeat

Vladimir Putin’s “United Russia” party suffered a major setback at the polls, potentially losing its parliamentary majority just months before Putin seeks to return to the Presidency. The results will likely force the Party to form a coalition with opposition parties. United Russia garnered at best 47% of the vote, compared to its 64% in the previous election four years ago, and probably would have been much less if the authorities hadn’t resorted to ballot stuffing and illegal voting.

The election has emboldened the opposition, which has staged huge rallies and parades in Moscow, this time with the grudging permission of the authorities. Putin himself has been booed when he has made public appearances, something that he claims—as only a former KGB officer could suggest—was the result of American “meddling” in Russia (specifically Secretary of State Clinton).

Before anyone starts rejoicing, keep in mind that the major beneficiaries of United Russia’s fall have been the Communist Party, and the strongly nationalist Liberal Democratic Party led by the erratic Vladimir Zhirinovsky. So far those reaping the fruits of Putin and Medvedev’s downturn have not been the forces advocating for greater democracy and liberalization, although corruption and nepotism have been a focus. So far this is not a “Russian Spring”, perhaps more a “Russian revanchism” (return to the days of a “strong leader”?), but hold on—this shift is far from over.

Europe avoids a collapse—for now—but the debt crisis is far from solved

The 27-nation European Union summit ended with a band-aid being placed on the continent’s economic crisis, enough to get by for now but far less than what is necessary to seriously address Europe’s burgeoning debt crisis. While some breathed a sigh of relief that a global economic meltdown was averted, in fact the EU tried—and failed—to come up with a grand plan to fix the underlying fundamental challenge. At best they kicked the can down the road for a few months. That’s all.

The only “concrete” result of the Summit was a pledge—nothing more—to work towards a new treaty binding them together in an effort to save the Euro. Leaders have tried, and repeatedly have failed, to come up with a solution to the debt crisis, especially among the southern “PIGS”—Portugal, Greece, Spain and Italy. The pact that emanated from this meeting is very complicated, may require national referendums to pass, must be accomplished in a matter of months when it has taken years in the past to achieve even modest changes, and must overcome powerful employee unions’ opposition to any austerity measures.

The big winner, if there was one, from the meeting was Chancellor Angela Merkel, and the session signaled the growing clout of Germany. At the same time it marked a further distancing of the United Kingdom from the Continent and the increasing isolation of Britain from Europe—much of that due to PM David Cameron’s refusal to join in the commitment to a new treaty. Cameron himself sought a face-saving compromise, one that would allow him to satisfy the intense anti-Europe sensitivities of his Conservative Party. Cameron had incurred the wrath of his own party back home by suggesting the UK should be helpful in assisting its neighbors save the Euro. Ironically, Cameron is very much in synch with Germany and France as a leading advocate of austerity that Merkel and Sarkozy are pushing.

Both Merkel and Sarkozy said they had no interest in trying to placate Cameron and the UK. As a result, Britain is even further isolated in Europe.

The net result of the Summit is that the crisis has once again been delayed, Germany—and to a lesser extent France—has solidified its leadership and dominant position in European economic issues, Britain is even more isolated, and the countries on the southern rim must take domestically impossible austerity measures to reduce spending and rein in government employee compensation. Hmm—sound familiar?

JCS Chairman Dempsey reiterates that the most critical security issue is the Economy

Former Chairman of the JCS Admiral Mike Mullen raised some eyebrows when he stated explicitly that the biggest threat facing the U.S. was the national debt. This week the current Chairman, Army General Marty Dempsey, extended that worry further by saying that today “We are extraordinarily concerned about the health and viability of the euro….because of the potential for civil unrest and the breakup of the European Union”. Wow—very unusual for a CJCS, to say the least.

The comments illustrate two points. First, one would expect the country’s top military man to comment on global terrorism threats, the military challenges in the Mideast, or what rogue nations like North Korea or Iran do. Here the Chairman is again saying that the economy and particularly the debt crisis, are at the top of the challenges we face. Second, his focus illustrates that the European economic crisis is also an unexpected concern and focus of our military commanders—the health of the economies of our key allies.

The national budget has also fixated the top military and civilian leadership at the Pentagon. Not surprisingly, since the failure of the so-called “Super Committee” means that the stipulations proscribed in the Budget Control Act passed by Congress now come into play. This “sequestration” means that government spending will be automatically cut by $1.2 trillion in 2013, with the axe falling primarily on the Defense Department. In addition to the $350 billion of cuts already agreed on, DOD could lose up to another trillion dollars—nearly a fifth of the total—from its projected spending plans through 2023. If that happens, according to Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta, America would have the smallest ground force since 1940, the fewest ships since 1915, and the smallest air force in its history.

Well, it’s doubtful that sequestration will actually happen, but given the paralysis that now encompasses the nation’s capital, who knows?

NRC Chairman Jaczko is causing the nation serious damage his colleagues charge? So why has he not been removed?

Even though he has been the subject of an extremely scathing report by the Inspector General of his own agency. Even though now all four of his fellow commissioners of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission say that they have “grave concerns” that the NRC Chairman, Greg Jaczko, is causing “serious damage” to the Commission and has created a horrible work environment marked by “bullying” and a total “lack of understanding”, he has not been removed.

How could this be? This is the Chairman who overrode a Technical Panel review that concluded that closing the Yucca nuclear waste repository was illegal. But he brushed aside that conclusion and ordered the Repository to be shuttered anyway. Congressman Darrell Issa says that the letter of complaint from Jaczko’s fellow commissioners shows a serious breach of trust. Commissioners and staff have complained about the Chairman’s “brusque” style, that the Commission’s staff operates in an atmosphere of intimidation, and that his behavior is “absolutely unacceptable”.

So why has he not been replaced? President Obama has the authority and has been urged to do so by Congressional representatives? How is that such incompetence, corrosive behavior, widely condemned unilateral decisions, and having created a “chilled work environment”, could permit him to stay on, you might ask. How could it be that a Chairman of a key agency who has been lambasted by his own Inspector General could stay on?

Oh, silly us. We forget that Jaczko formerly worked for SEN Harry Reid, the Majority Leader and key ally for the President’s legislative agenda, whose opposition to the Yucca repository is well known. It appears that Reid will not permit his one time lackey, or staffer, to be replaced. In fact, just today, SEN Reid labeled the charges against Jaczko as nothing but “a politically-motivated witch hunt”. Did he forget that two of the four Commissioners are Democrats appointed by President Obama?

It also appears that Nevada’s senior leadership, including SEN Dean Heller, GOV Brian Sandoval, and former SEN Dick Bryan, who heads up the state Committee on Nuclear Projects, are content to not raise any concerns and leave this corrosive individual in charge of the very important NRC, despite his demonstrated incompetence and lack of trust and support. And that’s a shame, isn’t it?

Tyrus W. Cobb